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INTRODUCTION

Post-New Deal constitutionalism is in search of a theory thatjustifies judicial intervention on behalf of individual rights while simultaneously avoiding the charge of "Lochnerism."' The dominant
historical view dismisses post-bellum substantive due process as an
t A.B. Brown University;, J.D. Harvard Law School. Associate Professor, Fordham
University School of Law. Thanks to Bob Bone, Marty Flaherty, Lili Levi, Russ Pearce,
Harry Scheiber, Steve Schnably, Bill Treanor and Ruth Wedgwood for commenting on
earlier drafts of this article. Thanks to the Fordham University School of Law and the
University of Miami School of Law for research support. Vincent Altino, Ariel Kronman
and Steve Nordahl assisted expertly in the research for this article.
I Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum hours legislation
as an unconstitutional violation of freedom of contract because it was an unreasonable
exercise of the police power).
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anomalous development in the American constitutional tradition.
Under this approach, Lochner represents unbounded protection for
economic rights that permitted the judiciary to read laissezfaire,probusiness policy preferences into the constitutional text.
Today's revisionists have mounted a substantial challenge to the
dismissive views of traditionalists. Indeed, some claim Lochner reached
the right result, but for the wrong reason. The revisionists characterize substantive due process as a genuine, albeit unsuccessful, attempt
to apply constitutional protections for property and contract in light
of the economic, social and political situation in the late nineteenth
century. The revisionist account of Lochnezism is likely to replace the
dominant historical view and to transform a central understanding of
the American constitutional tradition. In particular, this view of
Lochneaism will likely influence the analysis of constitutional protection of economic rights.
The extent to which both sides in the current debate draw upon
the history of nineteenth century economic rights protection to validate their positions is striking. The standard criticism is that Lochner
marked a decisive break with the past, a break effected at the cost of
suppressing a heritage of collective regulatory intervention, utilizing
even the common law to do so. Revisionists respond that Lochner was
not part of a sudden eruption; rather, it continued a pre-Lochnertradition of substantive judicial review that was highly protective of economic rights.
Historical accounts of dubious accuracy have been produced by
both sides, even as they attempt to treat history as a source of binding
authority in constitutional law. Although a more accurate reading of
the history of constitutional protection of economic rights reveals lessons that do bind us, they are not the lessons suggested by the revisionists or the traditionalists. The protection of economic rights
requires some form of what amounts to substantive due process, but
history does not dictate its content. Our constitutional heritage simultaneously condemns us and liberates us, forcing us to continually recreate constitutional economic rights protection.
This Article will demonstrate that both sides have overlooked a
key element in the progression of economic rights protection from
the early nineteenth century through the Lochner era to the present
day: the changing conception of the principle of non-retroactivity.
This oversight may not be surprising in one sense, for the modem
view-traceable to the Lochner era itself-is that the principle of nonretroactivity is simply a mask for substantive review. But it was not
always so. The principle of non-retroactivity, heavily dependent upon
the notion of vested rights, was the primary organizing idea in the
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constitutional economic rights protection that preceded the Lochner
era of substantive due process.
The Lochner era stands as a bridge between nineteenth-century
jurisprudence and the present day. The standard critique errs in labeling Lochner as a break with the past. The revisionist account is
equally mistaken in finding Lochne~s lesson in the continuation of the
past. In contrast, the constitutional tradition revealed by history is
one of gradual metamorphosis. The nineteenth century idea of retroactivity drew heavily upon two distinctions that sound false to modem
ears. One-familiar to the system of estates in land-was a distinction
between "vested" legal interests and mere "expectancies." Drawing on
these notions, courts held that retroactive legislation could destroy expectancies but not vested rights. The second distinguished between
rights and remedies. Courts upheld retrospective legislation that
changed remedies without materially altering rights. Courts also consistently contrasted rights and remedies within a system that recognized discrete legal and equitable rights-describing the former as a
consequence of rules of law and the latter as a consequence of principles of equity. Drawing upon these notions, courts upheld retroactive
legislation tht afforded a remedy where none was previously available
if doing so implemented equitable rights whose enforcement was precluded only by a defect in the remedial law.
Broad-based changes in legal thought during the Lochner era undermined these distinctions, and in this partial sense the standard critique is correct in viewing the Lochner era as a break with the past.
The distinction between property and expectancies collapsed under
the weight of a critique that saw all legal interests of value as property.
Considerations that had once informed the analysis of equitable rights
were increasingly incorporated into an enlarged conception of legal
rules, leaving a greatly diminished role for equitable principles. Equitable rights came to be seen as subordinate to legal rights: mere responses to individual problems of remedial choice.
The modem era also represents a break with Lochners heritage,
but again, one that is only partial. As the theoretical importance of
retroactivity diminished, jurists in the nineteenth century increasingly
perceived the decision on whether a statute impinged upon economic
rights as requiring a choice between competing legal rules. Forced to
recognize the necessity of this choice, the Lochner Court blunted its
recognition by turning to an idealized vision of the common law of
property and contract. 2 The evolution of that vision has been decisively rejected in the standard critique.
2

On the use of common law rules as the basis for economic freedom in the late

nineteenth century, see Duncan Kennedy, Toward An HistoricalUnderstandingof Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 3
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Nonetheless, an important part of Lochneis gradual evolution
away from its nineteenth century heritage remains with us today. The
breakdown in the distinction between vested rights and expectancies
and between rights and remedies-central to Lochne?s development
of substantive due process-continues to inform the modem protection of economic rights. The same recognition of the need for choice
that conditioned the Lochner decision inspired the charge made by
critics that the Court usurped the legislature's role. Lochneis critique
of retroactivityjurisprudence rendered the substantive analysis of economic rights inevitable, just as it rendered the concept of vested
rights-retroactivity untenable.
The modem attack on substantive due process criticizes pre-Lochner non-retroactivity jurisprudence, as well as Lochne'?s incorporation
of common law property and contract rules into constitutional protections of economic liberty. Although modem critics rejected the Lochner Court's particular substantive choice, they could not retum to
vested rights-retroactivity as the basis for a constitutional analysis of
economic rights.
To look for a lesson from the evolution of the constitutional protection of economic rights is to examine the current debate on another level. The lesson lies in the process of critique and
metamorphosis, not in the answers to the constitutional questions of
the day. The revival of constitutional economic rights protection requires a theory of their legitimacy beyond that which is provided by
history. Nevertheless, the lessons of history are rich and provoking
and we will do well to consult history as we engage in an evolving
constitutional debate. Indeed, we must remain skeptical of attempts
to define part of that debate as taking place outside our constitutional
heritage.
Part I of this article outlines the interpretation of substantive due
process that remains dominant in constitutional theory and its recent
historical revision. Part II contrasts the treatments of retroactivity in
the constitutional protection of property and contract that are characteristic of the pre-Lochner and modem eras. Part III examines the
nineteenth century logic of retroactivity in the context of legal
(1980); see also MORTONJ. HoRImrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AmERIcAN LAw 1780-1860, at
253-66 (1977); MORTONJ. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERicAN LAw 1870-1960, at
9-31 (1992) [hereinafter HoRwrrz, 1870-1960]; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1745-48 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form
and Substance];Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism
of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 939, 940-58 (1985);John Nockleby, Note, TortiousInterference with ContractualRelations in theNineteenth Century: The TransformationofProperty, Contract,
and Tor4 93 HARv. L. REv. 1510 (1980); Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal
Thought, in THE PoLrcs OF LAW 18, 23-26 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. Ruv. 873, 879 n.30 (1987).

1993]

PROPERTY AND CONTRACT RIGHTS

thought and relates the transition from the concept of vested rightsretroactivity to substantive due process to changes in contemporary
ideas of property and equitable rights. The conclusion briefly discusses the implication of the analysis for attempted revivals of economic rights protection under the Constitution.
I
HISTORY AND THEORY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

A.

The Modem Assault on the Standard Criticism of Lochner

Substantive due process in the Lochner era is depicted by standard
critics as the unrestrained protection of economic rights that permitted the judiciary to import illegitimately laissez-faire, pro-business policy preferences into its explication of the constitutional text.3 The
condemnation of Lochner remains largely consistent with the contemporary criticism offered by Justice Holmes: "[The] constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez-faire."4 Although often offered as a unified

critique, the standard criticism actually comprises a methodological
and substantive component Methodologically, substantive due process violated the norm of non-discretionary adjudication upon which
the legitimacy of judicial review depends. Substantively, the Lochner
Era's protection of economic rights realized its counter-majoritarian
potential by imposing an economic theory that served the interests of
a few at the expense of the general public.
Many histories of the doctrinal evolution of the fourteenth
amendment from the Slaughter-HouseCases5 to Lochner clearly incorporate this methodological critique. The central theme of these histories is the Court's gradual transformation of due process from the
(legitimate) procedural to the (illegitimate) substantive variety after
initially failing to incorporate substantive economic liberty into the
privileges and immunities clause. 6 This account usually attributes the
development of substantive due process to the ascendance of natural
law jurisprudence and the identification of the elite bench and bar
7
with business interests.
3 BRUCE A. AcKEassN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 63-66 (1991) (discussing the
standard view).
4 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
6 See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24
HARV.L. REv. 366,368, 372-73 (1911); ROBERT McCLosKEY,THE AmmucAN SuPREME COURT
115-35 (1960); KERmrr L. HALL, THE MAGic MIRoR LAW IN AMEuCAN HISTORY 232-46
(1989).
7 See; e.g., EDWARD CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GoVERNMENT 59-68 (1948); CHARLYS G.
HAwNSs, THss REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 80-85 (1930); CHARuLs G. HAnwuS, THE
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The substantive critique is most clearly expressed by progressive
historians, who portray the battle over substantive due process as a
conflict between the "interests" and the "people."8 According to this
account, the Court's misguided protection of contractual freedom in
the name of economic liberty improperly shielded unequal property
distribution from the democratic expression of what Holmes referred
to as the "felt necessities of the time."9 Freedom of contract protected
those already possessed of economic power at the expense of the
masses. It prevented the government from intervening to regulate or
redistribute economic power in an attempt to approach "the equality
of position between the parties in which liberty of contract begins."' 0
The methodological and substantive components employed by
traditional critics depend upon a neutrality premise and a substantive
premise, both of which are currently under attack. The modern assault begins by noting an apparent contradiction in the jurisprudence
of substantive due process that grew out of the criticism of Lochner.
On the one hand, the standard criticism requires that courts be neutral among competing economic theories, allowing the choice of economic goals to be left to elected representatives. Under this neutral
approach, legislation affecting economic rights is upheld unless it is
without rational basis. By emphasizing the fit between statutory
means and legislative ends, the rationality requirement purports to
allow the legislature discretion over the choice of appropriate economic goals." This condemnation of "open-ended" substantive due
process nonetheless leaves the courts free to enforce more specific
constitutional provisions. Indeed, it even leaves them free to enforce
AMERICAN DocTmNE OFJUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1932); BENJAMIN F. WmGHT, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN CONSTrrrTONAL LAw 254-55 (1967); MCCLOSKEY, supra note 6, at 71-77, 104,
127-35.
8 Morton J. Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography, 63 OR. L. REv. 679 (1984)
(describing the approach of progressive historians).
9 OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881). See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75
(Holmes,J., dissenting) (discussing the right of the majority to enact a dominant viewpoint
into law).
10
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 27 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
11 See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Note, LegislativePurpose,Rationality, andEqualProtection, 82
YALE LJ. 123 (1972) (discussing the foundation of the rational basis test). The author also

argues powerfully that the rational basis test must implicitly rule out at least some plausible
legislative ends to avoid the conclusion that the legislature's chosen means are always perfectly suited to its ends. Id. at 154. In a similar vein, Felix Cohen noted that the rational
basis test, taken literally, would make the Court a "lunacy commission" charged with watching over the legislature. Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 819 (1935). Both reductioshave been avoided only because, consistent with the neutrality premise underlying post-Lochner review of economic rights, the
ends of economic legislation that are in fact ruled out by the rational basis test are those
that are believed to reflect a malfunction in democratic processes. See infra text accompanying note 12.
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the more open-ended clauses of the text, so long as they do so in a way
that promotes rather than inhibits democracy.1 2
The modem assault, on the other hand, charges that post-Lochner
jurisprudence tends to ignore the specific constitutional language that
does protect property and contract. Within the framework of modem
constitutional theory, the relative desuetude of these texts is as vulnerable to charges ofjudicial abdication of constitutional responsibility as
the expansive application of the due process clause was susceptible to
charges ofjudicial usurpation. This abdication is significant because,
as recent scholarship and case law show, the contracts and takings
clauses are alternative texts that can easily generate approaches and
outcomes similar to those Lochner era jurisprudence ascribed to substantive due process.1 3 Modem critics wonder how post-Lochner theorists can reconcile express substantive protection of property and
contract rights with a rational basis test for economic legislation that
defers to economic goals chosen by the legislature.1 4
The Supreme Court's approval of the reasonable impairment of
contractual obligations in Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell'5 typifies
the New Deal response to this question. The Court treated the express substantive protection of economic rights in the contract clause
in the same manner as the due process clause's protection of prop-

12

SeeJoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Disrusr 14-18 (1980), which contains a com-

prehensive statement of this position and accounts for much of the Warren Court's jurisprudence. Ely's defense of judicial review, that it is simultaneously democratically
legitimized and democratically reinforcing, is a creative synthesis ofJustice Black's textualism and Justice Frankfurter's processualism, in that it transcends those Justices' certain
disapprovals. Id. at 105-16. Prior to the Warren CourtJustices Black and Frankfurter were
the primary judicial contestants in the battle to establish a theory of constitutional protection for individual rights that incorporated the lessons of "Lochnerism." See, for example,
their respective opinions in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (arguing over
whether the incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment's limitations
on the states avoids or repeats the errors of Lochner). In its response to those concerns that
animated both Black and Frankfurter, Ely's theory reaches beyond the activities of the
Warren Court and helps to illuminate premises underlying all of post-New Deal constitutional law.
13

See, e.g., RicuARD A. EpsTruN, TAKINGS: PRvATE PROPERTY AND =hi POWR OF EMI277-82 (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKruGs] (attempting to resurrect Loch-

Nawr DoMAIN

ner-type protection for property and freedom of contract through "takings" and contract
clauses.); Richard A. Epstein, Toward A Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L.
REv. 703 (1984) [hereinafter Epstein, Contract Clause].
14 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 12, at 91-93 (noting first, the difficulty posed by the contracts clause for his theory ofjudicial review because it is "not wholly susceptible to convincing rationalization in terms of either the processes of government or procedure," and
second, the simultaneous difficulty of identifying and applying the "substantive value" incorporated in the clause in a manner consistent with the parameters of thejudicial role he
endorses).
15 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding a statutory moratorium on mortgage payments as
a reasonable impairment of the obligation of contracts).
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erty, on the theory that both clauses were equally open-ended. 16 But
the contracts and "takings" clauses are no more open-ended than the
equal protection clause or the provisions of the bill of rights that have
become the staple of modem constitutional protection for individual
rights. 17 If the canons of constitutional interpretation require substantive protection of economic rights, then the claim that the Court
can apply these protections while remaining genuinely neutral as between competing theories of economic rights is suspect. It would be
equally suspect to claim that the Court could protect freedom of
speech while remaining neutral as between competing theories of individual expression.
If the premise ofjudicial neutrality underlying Lochneis criticism
is rather dubious, then the substantive premise-that constitutional
protection of economic rights can be easily reconciled with the legislative pursuit of the common good-is equally fragile. Rationality review of economic legislation expresses judicial deference to the
legislature's response to "the felt necessities of the time." 18 The legislature's institutional advantages, which include institutional competence, expertise and electoral accountability, suggest that legislators
are better qualified to determine the general welfare and provide the
typical justification for judicial deference. 19
Nonetheless, recent scholarship and judicial decisions no longer
simply equate legislative intervention with the promotion of the common good; nor is the protection of economic rights automatically associated with the defense of entrenched interests. The increasing use
of economic analysis by scholars to evaluate legal rules has served to
dissipate the suspicion that economic analysis necessarily implies a
laissez-faireideology that sacrifices the welfare of the many to the interests of the few. 20 Economic analysis aspires to help discover the common good, and in so doing it can align itself against entrenched
interests who use political processes to insulate their own positions
from change that promotes general welfare. 2 ' Coupled with the per16 Id. at 426 (including the contracts clause within the broad clauses necessarily requiringjudicial construction, as opposed to the narrow clauses, such as the provision establishing that each state shall have two senators).
17 See LEARNED HAND, THE BiLu OF RIGHTS (1958).
18 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19 See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 1753-66 (discussing the institutional competence and political question "gambits" in the post-New Deal conception of
the judicial role in public law). The references to the legislature (or to legislation) here
include administrative agencies (and regulations) whose authority ultimately derives from
their status as delegates of the legislature.
20
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis ofEntitlement Problems: A Clitique, 33
STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981) (discussing the contributions of liberal practitioners of law and
economics).
21
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955) (rejecting
equal protection challenge to economic legislation).
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ception that legislation or equivalent administrative rules may be a
poor measure of the common good because of logrolling, agency capture, and interest group politics, the revival of economic analysis in
law suggests that the protection of economic rights against political
intervention may itself be justified as being in the public interest. 22 At
the very least, economic analysis undermines the simplistic assumption that economic legislation always protects the people against entrenched interests. Economic analysis properly focuses on identifying
the interests that are served by particular regulations rather than on
making blithe assertions about the general welfare.
Independently of the revival of economic legal analysis, the bases
for the presumption of deference are being attacked on more traditional grounds. The dominant substantive critique of Lochner uses
considerations of institutional competence, expertise and electoral accountability to justify deference to legislation that affects economic
rights. It accepts the lack of deference to legislation affecting personal rights as a necessary antidote to unrestrained democracy, which
tends to oppress those without political power 28 and destroy the bases
of its own legitimacy. 24 But discontent with the distinction between
property and personal rights, which is the heritage of New Deal constitutionalism, spans the political spectrum. 25 Criticisms from the left
and the right deny the separation between economic rights and personal liberty. 26 Even the Supreme Court has directly attacked the dis-

tinction between property and personal rights:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than
22
On the general point, there seems to be agreement between liberal and conservative critics of interest group politics. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 49-50 (1985); DAvm W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE
ECONOMICS OF CoNs-rrrUTIONA. LAW AND PUBLIC CHOIcE (1992) (applying public choice
theory to constitutional law).
23 A classic example is the notion that the courts should protect "discrete and insular
minorities." United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
24 Classic examples are Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (declaring white-only
primaries unconstitutional) and Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (establishing the
principle of one person, one vote).
25 For criticism from the left, see Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733,
771-74 (1964) (arguing that the distinction misses the importance of private property to
political liberty, especially for those who have little); Leonard W. Levy, Property as a Human
Righ 5 CONST. CoMnTarARY 169, 182-84 (1988) (arguing along the same lines as Reich).
For criticism from the right, see Epstein, Contract Clause, supra note 13, at 704, 705; EpsTErN, Tnms, supra note 13, at 277-82 (urging Lochner-type protection for freedom of
contract and property through "takings" and contract clauses.).
26 See Epstein, Contract Clause, supra note 13, at 138; Milton Friedman, The Relation
Between EconomicFreedom and PoliticalFreedom, in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW
77-91 (Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1975); Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the
ConstitutionalIdea of Property, 72 IowA L. REv. 1319, 1329 (1987).
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the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "personal" right,
whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a
savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That
rights in
27
property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.
The potential for oppression or delegitimation is as acute in the area
of economic rights as it is in the area of personal rights. Deference to
economic legislation, therefore, cannot be justified by institutional
competence, expertise or electoral accountability any more than it
28
can justify personal rights legislation.
B.

The Role of History in the Current Debate

Despite substantial critique of its theoretical premises, the standard criticism of Lochner continues to exert a powerful influence on
constitutional protection of economic rights. Much of that influence
derives from its historical foundation. Unlike the debate over protections for personal rights, the present contest over constitutional protection of property and contract primarily implicates constitutional
history. That it does so is an artifact of the Lochner era and the attack
on substantive due process that it engendered. To a large extent, the
defense and critique of substantive due process was overtly historical,
and legal history, purposefully or not, assumed a critical role in the
debates.
In the lawyers' histories, which late nineteenth and early twentieth century courts relied upon tojustify substantive due process, some
economic regulations-even if admittedly well-suited to contemporaneous social needs-were portrayed as fundamentally inconsistent
with historically embedded constitutional principles. For instance,
the New York Court of Appeals in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Company9 struck down that state's workers compensation statute as violative of the federal due process clause. The court reasoned that the
compensation scheme violated the principle of no liability without
fault, which it perceived to be historically embedded in the common
law and therefore constitutionally immune from regulatory intervention.3 0 The court expressed considerable sympathy for the statute's
27 Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (citations omitted).
28 Reich, supranote 25, at 779-85; Michael W. McConnell, ContractRights and Property
Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between IndividualLiberties and ConstitutionalStructure,
76 CAL. L. Ray. 267, 270-76 (1988) (framers identified creditors as a class particularly vulnerable to factional politics at the state level).
29
94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
30
Id. at 439 ("When our Constitutions were adopted, it was the law of the land that no
man who was without fault or negligence could be held liable in damages for injuries
sustained by another").
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policy goals and deference to the blue ribbon commission that had
proposed it. In the end, however, the court concluded that a constitutional amendment was required to uphold the statute. According to
the court, the historical foundation of the fault principle made it unnecessary to engage in explicit discussion of its consequences or its
merits. This perception of historical legitimacy, applied generally to
common law rules, provided an essential link between the formalist
methods of the Lochner era substantive due process cases and their
3
outcomes. '
Lochners critics focused their attention upon the foundations of
alleged common law rules threatened by legislative change. Within
the canons of scholarly objectivity, the courts' historical premises were
vulnerable to contradiction. Consequently, academic legal histories
disputed the claim that, historically, the common law was hostile toward economic regulation. 32 The retelling of history helped to legiti31
For an important account of the role of historicism in late nineteenth century constitutional interpretation, with a particular emphasis on the development of substantive
due process, see Stephen A. Siegel, LochnerEraJurisprudenceand theAmerican Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1, 66-99 (1991).
By the "formalist method of substantive due process cases," I mean only to refer to the
courts' reliance, when deciding constitutional cases, on an historical definition of economic rights in order to avoid an extensive analysis of the social consequences of economic
regulations. I do not mean to adopt the view that the dichotomy between formalist and
instrumentalist styles of legal reasoning provides much that can help us understand the
structure of ideas that characterized late nineteenth century legal thought, nor do I even
concede that it necessarily captures important changes in the approach indicative of the
early and late nineteenth centuries. For critiques of the use of instrumentalist and formalist styles of legal reasoning as determinants of economic rights, see EDWARD A. PURCELL,
JR., LrIATION AND INEQUAUr. FEDERAL DvERsrryJuRIsDICrION IN INDUSnuAL AMERICA,
1870-1958, at 253-54 (1992);James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretationsof the Federal
Contract Clause: The TransformationFrom Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BuFF.
L. REV. 381, 387-97 (1982); Harry N. Scheiber, Instrumentalism and PropertyRights: A Reconsideration of American "Styles of LegalReasoning" in the Nineteenth Centuy, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 1,
12-18. Professor Purcell lumps together the classic attempts to utilize styles of legal reasoning to explain outcomes and recent efforts to understand historical forms of legal consciousness as loosely-bound systems of shared commitments and assumptions that he notes
extend far beyond modes of legal reasoning. Id. at 394 n.13. I would therefore not apply
the critique of the former to the latter, which should be understood as developing a descriptive model that is not encompassed in the narrower uses of the term formalism.
32 See Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1017, 104243
(1981) (noting how progressive historians "discovered a history of extensive state promotion and regulation of the economy through legislative and administrative, as well as judicial action, so that the New Deal, in perspective, could be seen as the culmination of an
American tradition of pragmatic response to social needs, without excessive fussing about
ideological laissez-faire"). Primary examples include LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW oF TE
COMMOmvEALTH Am Cm=FJusEicE SHAw 229-65 (1957) and the sources cited in Gordon,
supra,at 1042 n.94. See also Michael L. Benedict, Laissez-Faireand Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of
the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,3 LAw & HIST. REv. 293, 293-98 &
nn. 9 & 15 (1985) (noting that the earlier histories emphasizing government intervention
in the nineteenth century economy perpetuate the view of Lochner as improperly protecting privileges of the wealthy and of corporations).
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mize a series of Lochner critiques, from sociological jurisprudence to
legal realism. 33 As the critics showed, the lawyers' histories, upon
which Lochner era courts relied, suppressed a common law past that
included collective regulatory intervention. For example, if common
law rules did not consistently reflect a principle of no liability without
fault, then the use of a fault principle had no firm historical basis.
The establishment of the fault principle, therefore, entailed a policy
choice whose legitimacy depended on a democratic process.
The professional histories attacking Lochner's legitimacy related
the illegitimacy of its pedigree with a conviction rivaled only by the
antithetical story once told by Lochneis supporters. 3 4 Their claim
gradually supplanted the older version, in which economic regulations interfered with an historically determined system of common law
rules organized around principles of private property, no liability without fault, and freedom of contract. The new story alleged that substantive due process corrupted an otherwise consistent tradition of
35
pragmatic judicial and legislative adaptation of law to social needs.
More recently, however, professional historians have again challenged the constitutional orthodoxy. Although recent histories challenging the dominant interpretation of Lochner are quite diverse, they
commonly reject previous attempts to depict substantive due process
as a sharp break in the American constitutional tradition. Those repudiating the methodological critique of Lochner as extra-constitutional have established that the emphasis of previous scholars' on the
late nineteenth century belief in natural rights is misplaced. Thejurisprudence of substantive due process owed at least as much to constitutional positivism, and its conception of enforcing popular sovereignty
36
through textual interpretation, as it did to natural rights theory.
33 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contrac 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 568-70 (1933);
Cohen, supra note 11, at 842-47; Robert L. Hale, Bargaining Duress, andEconomic Liberty, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 603, 606-07 (1943); Robert L. Hale, Coercion andDistributionin a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. ScL Q. 470 (1923); Roscoe Pound, Liberty ofContract 18 YALE LJ.
454 (1909); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of SociologicalJurisprudence(pts. 1-3), 24

HARv. L. REv. 591 (1911), 25 HARv. L. REv. 140 (1911), 25 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1912).
34

HoRwrrz, 1870-1960, supra note 2, at 7 (orthodox view that the New Deal's constitu-

tional revolution was a conservative restoration of pre-Lochner principles reflects legitimating needs of the New Deal rather than historical truth). Professor Horwitz links post-New
Deal constitutional orthodoxy to the continuing influence of progressive historiography,
with its simplistic premise of conflict between the "people" and the "interests," on the legal
history of the Gilded Age. Id. Benedict, supra note 32, at 296-97 notes the same linkage
and goes so far as to argue that it is "possible once more to make sense of laissez-faire
constitutionalism" only because "the intellectual commitments forged in the Progressive
and New Deal eras have faded." Id. at 296.
35 See Gordon, supra note 32, at 1055-56 (discussing importance of adaptation theories
in post-New Deal legal history).
36 Earlier histories stressing the impact of beliefs in positivism and natural law on the
constitutional protection of individual rights associated positivism with legislative sovereignty. In contrast, constitutional positivism associates positivism with popular sovereignty
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The prevalence of constitutional positivism diminishes the significance of the alleged discontinuity between constitutional protections
of economic rights that characterized substantive due process and
those that preceded it.37 Moreover, the acceptance of constitutional
positivism as an historically legitimate form of constitutional interpretation blunts the claimed methodological distinction between Lochner
era and modem protection of individual rights. In a strong application of the argument, constitutional positivism allows that Lochner's
protection of freedom of contract was the right result reached for the
38
wrong reason; it should have been attributed to the contracts clause.
In a weaker form of the argument, constitutional positivism does not
necessitate the resurrection of freedom of contract. Nonetheless, it is
inconsistent with post-New Deal deference to economic legislation.3 9
The revision of the substantive Lochner critique challenges the
earlier professional histories that portrayed substantive due process as
a radical departure explained by the identification of the elite bench
and bar with business interests.4 0 Focusing on late nineteenth century
decisions restricting governmental power to promote business and allowing legislation to destroy economic privileges previously granted,
scholars have established that judicial identification with business interests is too broad to explain much of the Lochner era courts' attitude
toward economic legislation. 4 ' Scholars have also increasingly noted
that the notoriety of the decisions invalidating economic regulations
exceeded the number of such cases and that many regulations passed
as expressed in the constitutional text. See Kainen, supra note 31, at 388-89. In the latter
conception, active judicial protection of individual rights may be justified without reliance
on the proposition that laws are unconstitutional because they violate natural rights, a
proposition frequently denied by late nineteenth century proponents of substantive due
process. Id. at 392 n.46; HoRwrrz, 1870-1960, supra note 2, at 156-59.
37 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 12, at 209-11 n.41 (arguing that the Marshall Court's protection of economic rights was also consistent with constitutional positivism).
38
See, e.g., Epstein, Contract Clause, supra note 13, at 729 (freedom of contract follows
from the contracts clause, not from due process).
39 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 12, at 92 (arguing, for example, that difficulty in establishing limits on freedom of contract requires application of contracts clause only to contracts
previously formed); Douglas Kmiec &John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to
the Original Understanding,14 HAsTrNGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 529-34 (1987) (original understanding of the contracts clause requires that it be interpreted to apply only to retrospective legislation which violates vested contractual rights); McConnell, supra note 28, at 27076; Richard G. Taranto, Note, A Process-OrientedApproach to the Contract Clause,89 YALE LJ.
1623, 1625 (1981) (urging a theory of the contract clause that "would scrutinize the manner in which the legislature has adopted the particular law, but would not intrude upon
the legislature's substantive policy judgment").
40 The best of these studies remains ARNOLD PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRIsis AND THE RULE
OF LAW (1960) (discussing the triumph of laissez-faire conservatism over traditional
conservatism).
41
Kainen, supranote 31, at 396-97; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporationin
American Legal Though 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1612-27 (1988).
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the test of substantive due process as legitimate exercises of police
42
power.
Reevaluation of the relationship between substantive due process
and business interests has led historians to reconceive the Lochner Era
as representing a less radical departure from previous judicial efforts
to protect economic rights. Judicial participation in the attack on economic privileges in late nineteenth century constitutional economic
rights cases establishes continuity with the Taney Court and Jacksonian ideology.43 Moreover, late nineteenth century jurists, schooled
in pre-civil war classical American political economy, attributed monopoly to the existence of legislatively-created corporate privileges,
and thus were hostile towards economic concentration. 44 The sharply
contrasting historical portrayals of prominent late nineteenth century
treatise authors Christopher Tiedeman and Thomas Cooley provide a
striking example of the modem revision. Initially, they were depicted
as among the most highly influential proponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism. 45 In recent portrayals, however, they evoke the hostility
toward corporate power and economic concentration characteristic of
the early nineteenth century. 46 Recent doctrinal studies all recognize
42
PURCELL, supra note 31, at 401 n.50 (discussing emerging scholarly consensus);
Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation Duringthe ProgressiveEra: A Reevaluation, 72J. Am. HisT. 63 (1985).
43
Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Feld and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parametersof Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism, 1863-1897,61J. AM. Hisr. 970 (1975);
Stephen A. Siegel, Understandingthe Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property/PrivilegeDistinction and Takings' ClauseJurisprudence,60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1986).
44 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American
Historical Perspective; 62 TEx. L. REv. 1263, 1295-1308 (1984); Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Political Economy of SubstantiveDue Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379, 428-40 (1988); HoRwrrz,
1870-1960, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasizing "basic continuity in American constitutional
history before the New Deal" by showing the Lochner Court to be "strongly representative of
the old conservative view that big business was unnatural and illegitimate").
45

CLYDE

E. JACOBS, LAW WRITER AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M.
G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER

LAW (1954); BENJAMIN R. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAIsSEz-FMR CAME
TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942).
46
See Louise A. Halper, Christopher G. Tiedeman, "Laissez-faireConstitutionalism"and the

Dilemmas of Small-Scale Property in the Gilded Age, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 1349, 1357-58, 1368-82
(1990) (emphasizing hostility to economic concentration in Tiedeman's thought and thus
its continuity with early nineteenth century constitutionalism); AlanJones, Thomas M, Cooley and "Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751, 752 (1967)
(emphasizing Jeffersonian and Jacksonian roots of Cooley's thought and its hostility to
business interests qua interests, thus characterizing Cooley as "an historically minded common lawyer, who was less concerned with abstract theories of economic liberty than with
maintaining the older, broader, and more ambiguous doctrine of equal rights"). Interestingly, ProfessorJones sought to distinguish Cooley from other "true" laissez-faire constitutionalists such asJustice Brewer, but Brewer also found his defender. See Robert E. Gamer,
Justice Brewer and Substantive Due Process: A ConservativeCourt Revisited, 18 VAND. L. REv. 615
(1965) (noting Justice Brewer's hostility toward government-granted privileges and legal
monopolies).
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the continuity of the nineteenth century's economic rights protection,
whether emphasizing the extent to which property was afforded protection or emphasizing the extent to which it was subject to
destruction. 47
Revisionist scholarship establishes that an accurate constitutional
history must understand the tension between economic rights and
public power as a more fluid and dynamic conflict than that captured
in the standard accounts. 48 The framework for incorporating the insights of revisionist scholarship, however, remains limited by the continuing influence of Lochner's standard interpretation. Despite
substantial revision of its overall significance, the core doctrinal account of the transformation of due process from procedural to substantive persists largely unaltered. 4 9 The standard interpretation of
Lochneras somehow extra-constitutional continues to exert a powerful
influence upon what it is that constitutional historians seek to explain
and modem constitutional theorists attempt to avoid. That assessment, however, is less an accurate portrayal of how nineteenth century
legal thinkers understood the protection of property and contract,
than a reflection of modem constitutional theory's legitimizing needs.
Modem constitutional theory still responds to the protection of individual rights and the avoidance of Lochnerism as its central dynamic.
Because it does so, it seems to require a flat rejection of Lochner as a
matter of constitutional interpretation. Otherwise, the theory threatens to implode in self-contradiction: it simultaneously criticizes the
Lochner era for judicially imposing a substantive theory of property
and contract protection and for choosing to impose the wrong substantive theory.5 0
Expanding the focus beyond the textual interpretation of the due
process clauses contained in state and federal constitutions permits a
47 See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, PropertyLaw, Expropriation,and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33J. EcoN. HiST. 232 (1973); Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REv. 217, 227-28 (1984)

[hereinafter Scheiber, PublicRights] (emphasizing continuity of the law of eminent domain
in the nineteenth century and its limited protection of property); Siegel, supranote 43, at
10 (emphasizing continuity in the "letter... spirit and application" of contract clause
doctrine from the Marshall Court until the New Deal in its protection of "property" as
opposed to "privilege").
48 See, e.g., Scheiber, Public Rights, supra note 47, at 217 (invoking a tripartite model of
tension between vested rights, entrepreneurial initiatives and public rights that questions
earlier emphasis on vested rights or economic growth as singular explanations for the extent of economic rights protection).
49
HALL, supra note 6, at 230-36.
50 For a striking example of this contradiction, see Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding
the Lochner Era: Lessonsfrom the Controversy over Railroadand Utility Rate Regulation,70 VA. L.
REv. 187 (1984). Siegel describes how liberals attacking Lochner era rate regulation cases
vacillated between claiming that the Court chose the wrong cost-basis from which to derive
a fair return on investment and asserting that the choice of any particular cost-basis entailed a policy choice that could only properly be made by legislatures.
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broader picture of doctrinal development to emerge, one that is
based on the relationship between economic rights and the non-retroactivity principle. The expanded focus leads to alternative conceptions of how nineteenth century jurists incorporated constitutional
economic rights protection into their perception of the legitimate
role of the judiciary. These alternative conceptions help to create a
framework for understanding the constitutional history of economic
rights from a vantage point outside the terms established by the debate over Lochner.
II
RETROACTIVITY

IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AND MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS

Pre-Lochnerand modern constitutional retroactivityjurisprudence
both embrace the view that retrospectivity5 l per se does not invalidate a
statute affecting economic rights. 5 2 Nonetheless, the formal similarity

between nineteenth century and modern constitutional rules conceals
a significant change in analysis. Conceived to encompass "vested
rights-retroactivity," the non-retroactivity principle had real force in
the context of pre-Lochner constitutional protection of economic
rights against the state. In contrast, retroactivity is a superfluous category in modern due process analysis. 53 The modern analysis treats the
51

This Article follows standard practice in using the terms retrospectivity and retroac-

tivity interchangeably. See NORMAN J. SINGER, 2 SUTHERLAND

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 41.01, at 337 (5th ed. 1993) ("The terms 'retroactive' and 'retrospective' are synonymous
in judicial usage and may be employed interchangeably"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1184
(5th ed. 1979) (" '[R]etroactive' or 'retrospective' laws are generally defined from a legal
viewpoint as those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws,
create new obligations, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to the
transactions or considerations already past."). See alsoJOHN Scuu..ocK, RETROACTVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS IN LAND 1-3 (1953) (drawing no distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity). But see GregoryJ. DeMars, Retrospectivity and Retroactivity of Civil
Legislation Reconsidered, 10 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 253, 254-57 (1983) (arguing that the two
terms are significantly different).
The nineteenth century legal thinkers who are the focus of the present study drew no
distinction between retrospectivity and retroactivity. See, e.g., HENtRY C. BLAcK, AN EssAy ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST LEGISLATION IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF
CONTRACTS, AND AGAINST RETROACtiVE AND Ex POST FACTO LAws § 170, at 211-12 (1887);
THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GoVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 160 (2d ed. 1874) (originally published in 1857); WILLIAM P. WADE, A TREATISE ON THE OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF
RETROACTIVE LAWS, As AFFECTED BY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETA-

§ 1, at 2 (1880); W.W.B., The Right of a Legislature (Without Reference to the Law of
Eminent Domain) to Change the Legal Characterof Estates, or the Title in Property, By General or
Special Enactments, (pts. 1 & 2), 7 AM. L. REG. 449, 513 (1859) (using retroactive and retrospective interchangeably).
52 See infra text accompanying notes 67 and 99.
53 See infra text accompanying note 100.
TIONS
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notion of vested rights as vacuous and collapses the idea of non-retroactivity into substantive due process.
A.

The Importance of Retroactivity and Vested Rights in the
Nineteenth Century

The idea of retroactivity played a central role in the constitutional
protection of property and contract rights before the late nineteenth
century development of substantive due process. When protecting
contracts against impairment or property against deprivation by other
than "due process of law" or "the law of the land," nineteenth century
courts perceived themselves as shielding individual rights from only
retrospective interference. In the most apparent manifestation of this
limitation, the Supreme Court conceived the federal Contract Clause
to prohibit impairment of contractual obligations created before the
enactment of the challenged statute, but to extend no protection to
contracts formed thereafter. 54 Thus, "laws which impair the obligation of contracts are fairly embraced within the meaning of [retroactive laws] ....

[I] t is precisely their retroactive operation which lays

them open to constitutional objection."5 5 Similarly, pre-Lochner era
courts conceived of state and federal constitutional protection of
property against legislative interference as "intended to guard the
rights of individuals against the consequences of retroactive legislation."5 6 Thus, on the eve of the development of substantive due process, commentators summing up case law on the constitutional
protection of economic rights interpreted the textual protections for
property and contract rights as various species of non-retroactivity.
The ubiquity of the idea of retrospectivity in the nineteenth century protections of property and contract rights against state interference is manifest in the extent to which it controlled the interpretation
of textual constitutional protections for "economic" rights. 5 7 One
commentator writing in 1880, for example, described the following
experience. Beginning with an inquiry into the constitutionality of
state insolvency laws, the commentator ended with "a thorough examination of all the adjudged cases where laws operating upon past
transactions had been construed, or their constitutionality deter54

See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827);

BENJAMIN

F. WRIGHT,THE

CONTRAaT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 28-29 (1938); Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court

and the Contract Clause, 57 HARv. L. REv. 512-57, 621-74, 852-92 (1944); Kainen, supra note

31, at 411-13; Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 1593.
55
BLACE, supra note 51, § 170, at 212.

56 WADE, supra note 51, § 10, at 12-13 (due process and law of the land clauses "should
render vested rights sufficiently secure against the retroactive operation of statutes"). See
idi
§ 156, at 187.
57 The phrase "economic" rights simply refers generically to "contract" or "property"
rights and does not necessarily endorse distinguishing them from "personal" rights.

CORNELL LAW REVWEW

[Vol. 79:87

mined."5 8 The inquiry included a review of all the operative nineteenth century constitutional protections for economic rights-the
federal contract and due process clauses, as well as various state due
process, law of the land, and retrospective legislation clauses.5 9 The
message was that the subject matter, namely retroactive laws conceived
as "legislative acts ... operat[ing] upon some subject, or affect[ing]
some right or obligation, which existed prior to the passage of the
acts," 60 required such extensive treatment The jurisprudence of constitutionally protected economic rights concerned the extent to which
various positive constitutional provisions protected individuals against
backward looking interference with past transactions. 6 1
To understand the significance of retrospectivity as an organizing
principle in constitutional law prior to the development of substantive
due process, it is necessary to understand both its breadth and its narrowness in comparison to alternate conceptions of retrospectivity.
First, nineteenth century legal thinkers conceived the category of retrospective statutes to include not only those with effective dates preceding their enactment, but also any statute that had a "retroactive"
effect on an existing legal interest. The most frequently cited definition of retrospectivity was offered by Justice Story in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler.62 Story rejected the narrow view, which
placed the retrospective label upon only those statutes "which are enacted to take effect from a time anterior to their passage." Story believed that such a narrow approach would be "utterly subversive" of
the New Hampshire constitution's prohibition on retrospective legislation. 63 In its place, Story adopted the view that a retrospective law is
one that "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing
laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a
new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already
past."6 4 Thus, the prevailing notion of retrospectivity focused upon
whether a statute operated to alter a pre-existing legal interest rather
than on whether the law itself purported to take effect before its
enactment. 65
58
59
60

WADE, supra note 51, at iii.
WADE, supra note 51, at iii.
WADE, supra note 51, § 1, at 2. Compare Story's definition of a retrospective law in

the text infra accompanying notes 62-65.
61
WADE, supra note 51, § 1, at 2. See also BtAcx, supra note 51, at v (noting "[t]he
cardinal importance of the general subject of retroactive laws-and its especial importance
as viewed in the light of the prohibitory clauses embodied in the Federal Constitution and
in the constitutions of most of the American States").
62
22 F. Gas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156).
63
Id. at 767.
64
Id.
65
Compare the definitions of retroactivity in the works cited in supra note 51, as well
as the text accompanying supra note 60. The narrow view of retrospectivity had apparently
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Consequently, jurists placed the "retrospective" label upon a
great deal of legislation that was only nominally prospective-in that it
became effective only after its passage-because of its effect on previously established property and contract rights. For example, the statute challenged in Wheder, which entitled a good faith possessor of real
estate to the value of his improvements as against the owner, did not
by its terms purport to be applicable except in subsequent actions for
possession. Nonetheless, Story held that the statute was retroactive
insofar as it applied to improvements made before the statute's
66
enactment.
Second, despite the potential breadth of the concept of retrospectivity, it was limited by the doctrine of vested rights. The notion of
vested rights acquired under existing law was narrower than the universe of all legal interests defined by the law existing at the time of
past transactions or considerations. Although Story's broad definition
in Wheeler might initially suggest otherwise, its emphasis on vested
rights makes it clear that the concept of retrospectivity permitted the
legislature to alter the rules affecting property and contract rights
without necessarily violating the proscription against tampering with
previously defined interests. 67 The prohibition against retrospective
laws protected only those interests, as defined by pre-existing law, that
had "vested" against substantive legislative interference.
In effect, the doctrine of vested rights narrowed the proscription
against retroactive interference with economic rights, thereby preventing retroactivity from becoming an all-inclusive limitation that would
effectively freeze the existing legal regime of contract and property
rules. 68 Retroactivity did not protect all legal interests that might be
thought to be defined by the standing law: non-vested interests were
subject to being extinguished by retrospective changes in applicable
property or contract rules. For example, a wife's capacity to be endowed of lands thereafter acquired by her husband is a legal interest
defined by the standing law. According to Pomeroy, however, the
courts do not protect this interest against retrospective alteration because, unlike inchoate dower in lands of which a husband is already
69
seized, the interest in after-acquired lands is not a vested right.
Alternatively, statutes were often not considered retroactive at all
when the interests extinguished by new rules were not defined as
been developed in opposition to Parliament's practice of making statutes effective as of the
date of the commencement of the session. See Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive
Legislation: A Basic PrincipleofJurisprudence,20 Mm-N. L. REV. 775, 779 (1936).
66 Wheeer, 22 F. Cas. at 767.
67 To compare the modem view, see infra text accompanying note 111.
68 See Kainen, supra note 31, at 437.
69 SEDGWICK, supra note 51, at 162 (note on dower inserted in the second edition
(1874) by its editor, John Norton Pomeroy).
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vested rights. This approach implicitly limited the protection against
retrospective legislation to vested rights by denying legal recognition
to non-vested interests. Thus, non-vested interests were incapable of
being "extinguished" by subsequent legislation. For example, commenting on Pomeroy's discussion of dower, Wade argued that it was
unnecessary to admit "the right by a retroacting statute to abolish the
law giving dower in lands to be acquired ...

because a change in the

dower law which only affected after-acquired property would not be
retroacting.7 0 Wade conceived that "[t]here would be nothing upon
which [the statute] could retroact" because a recognized right to
dower did not accrue until "the husband's seisin of real estate during
71
coverture."
Thus, one analysis of retroactivity explicitly acknowledged that
non-vested interests could be extinguished, and another implicitly
yielded the same result by denying that a statute destroying non-vested
interests was retroactive. This doctrine has been aptly called "vested
rights-retroactivity." 72 While the breadth of the nineteenth century
conception of retrospectivity made it possible for the proscription
against retroactive legislation to encompass all constitutional protections for economic rights, the narrowing effect of the intimately related vested rights conception limited that proscription and rendered
it plausible.
The doctrine of "vested rights-retroactivity" explains the nineteenth century rule that retrospectivity perse does not invalidate a statute affecting economic rights. Ideas of retroactivity and vested rights
were central to understandings about appropriate constitutional protection of economic rights. These ideas influenced the extent to
which positive constitutional provisions were held to incorporate
prohibitions on retrospective legislation or protections for vested
rights. The extent to which express constitutional provisions were necessary to legitimize vested rights protection also entered the debate,
but because of the universal condemnation of vested rights-retroactive
statutes, the question was less important than a modem perspective
would assume.
A series of Supreme Court cases had the effect of limiting federal
constitutional protections for vested rights against retroactive legislation. In Calder v. Bull 73 the Supreme Court held that the federal pro-

hibition against ex post facto laws applied only to criminal, and not
civil, legislation. 74 The Court's holdings that the Fifth Amendment's
70
71
72

73
74

WADE,

supra note 51, § 180, at 216.

WADE, supra note 51, § 180, at 216.

The phrase is Professor Slawson's. See infra text accompanying note 101.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
Id. at 390-91.
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Due Process Clause was inapplicable to the states,75 and that the Con76
tract Clause protected only rights that had vested "by contract"
served to limit federal protection. These limitations on federal constitutional protection, however, did not altogether undermine the importance of vested rights-retroactivity. State constitutional provisions,
ranging from specific prohibitions on retrospective legislation to general prohibitions against deprivations of property except by "due process of law" or the "law of the land," were interpreted to fill in the gaps
by providing protection for vested rights against retrospective legisla77
tion that the federal constitution did not.

Consequently, whether constitutional provisions expressly prohibited vested rights-retroactive statutes affected only the scope of federal economic rights protection. 78 The Contract Clause provided
limited federal protection against retrospective state interferences
with economic rights because it protected only vested contract rights.
Although the federal due process and takings clauses were limited to
protection against federal interferences with property rights, state provisions protected vested property rights. Thus, vested rights-retrospectivity was a matter for debate only in the context of defining the
scope of federal protection of economic rights: considering both state
and federal constitutional law, all retroactive statutes interfering with
vested rights were unconstitutional. To decide, for example, whether
the ex post facto clause prohibited retrospective civil legislation was to
assume that it would be limited-as was state economic rights protec79
tion-to retrospective interference with vested rights.
Nineteenth century courts and commentators acknowledged the
questionable legitimacy of the judiciary's venturing beyond express
protections for economic rights in order "to declare a statute invalid
which violates the fundamental guarantees of the social compact or
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 88 (1834).
77 In 1868, Cooley's summary of the state cases protecting vested rights was incorporated in his chapter entitled "Ofthe Protection to Property by the 'Law of the Land.'" He
prefaced his discussion by noting that "the phrase 'due process [or course] of law' is sometimes used, and sometimes 'the law of the land,' and in some cases both; but the meaning
75

76

is the same in every case." THOMAS M. COOLEY,A TREATisE ON THE LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POwER OF THE STATES IN THE AMERICAN UNION, § 353, (1868).

78 A statute did not violate the federalConstitution merely because it divested a vested
right. See supra text accompanying note 76.
79 For example, see Justice Johnson's opinion in and appendix to Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 414-16, 681-87 (arguing that the ex post facto clause applied to
civil legislation and that Calderhad been wrong on this point, although the case itself was
properly decided because there had been no violation of a vested right). See also Oliver P.
Field, Ex Post Factoin the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. Rxv. 315 (1922) (arguing that the framers
of the constitution intended the clause to apply to civil and criminal legislation).
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the spirit and genius of the Constitution."8 0 Nonetheless, differing
views on whether such intrusion was legitimate did not detract from
the perceived "substantive harmony of the decisions as to the constitutional status of retroactive laws." 8 ' One nineteenth century commentator believed that the judiciary could and should invalidate statutes
that violate implicit guarantees of the social compact or the Constitution.8 2 Another declared that "the courts are not at liberty to declare
a statute void, because, in their opinion, it invades the fundamental
principles of civil liberty or violates the maxims of republican government, unless those principles are declared and guaranteed by the
Constitution; nor because the act is opposed to the spiritof the Constitution."8 3 Both of these approaches to constitutional economic rights
protection, however, led to the question of what rights were "vested"
and thus immune from retrospective alteration:
In certain States [retroactive laws] are expressly prohibited; yet there
are several classes that are held valid, because not within ajust construction of the inhibition. In other States, retroactive laws, as such,
are not mentioned; yet the exclusion of such statutes as disturb
vested rights, or violate the spirit of the constitution or the implications necessarily drawn from it, leaves certain classes of retroactive
laws held valid, which are practically coincident with those just
84
mentioned.
No "substantive disharmony" emerged between cases decided in states
with express constitutional prohibitions of retrospective legislation
and cases from states where courts had recourse only to due process
and law of the land clauses. All these cases were conceived as protecting only vested rights against retrospective alteration. Since retrospectivity per se did not require a statute's invalidation, vested rights were
critical to retrospectivity analysis and retrospectivity analysis was critical to economic rights protection in every state, despite differences in
the states' textual protections for economic rights. The proper approach to constitutional interpretation was a difficult question of constitutional theory, but the consensus on retrospectivity analysis
rendered it unimportant to economic rights protection.
Nineteenth-century commentators also perceived vested rightsretrospectivity as directly implied by the concepts of sovereignty and
the rule of law. For example, Francis Wharton, in an 1876 article entiBLAcK, supra note 51, § 177, at 229.
BLACK, supra note 51, §§ 177-78, at 223-29 (elucidating the harmony in the
decisions).
82
BLAcK, supra note 51, § 177, at 229. See also SEDGWICK, supra note 51 (the protection
of vested rights defines the proper role of courts in securing individual rights against legis80
81

lative interference when there is no express federal or state constitutional shield).
83
BLAcK, supra note 51, at 228 n.3 (citing CooLAY, supra note 77 at § 164).
84 BLAcK, supra note 51, § 178, at 229.

1993]

PROPERTY AND CONTRACT RIGHTS

tled "Retrospective Legislation and Grangerism," examined the ques85
tion of the extent to which legislatures may impose rate regulation.
Wharton approached the issue from a perspective outside the immediate confines of American constitutionalism. For this purpose, he
posed the question raised by such legislation as the extent to which "a
statute [may] have a retrospective force." 8 6 By the term "statute" Wharton included any "law imposed by the sovereign," which is the sense of
87
the term as it is used in philosophical jurisprudence and Roman law.
Hence, neither the peculiarly American notion that the legislature's
powers were delegated by the sovereign people nor the peculiarly
American institution ofjudicial review would affect Wharton's conclusions as to the retrospective application of statutes:
When we discuss the question... whether the State of Wisconsin is
competent to adopt a statute reducing to a non-remunerative standard the railroad tolls of the State, the point is not met by saying
that the legislatureof Wisconsin has no such power. If Wisconsin, by
a constitutional convention, has this power, then Wisconsin has the
power to lower tolls by statute. So with regard to the Federal Government. If the Federal Government, by the agency of a federal
convention, or by passing amendments subsequently adopted by the
States, can make certain organic changes, these changes, in the
sense in which we here use the term, are effected by statute.88
Consequently, Wharton's contribution to the debate was to revert to
first principles that might limit rate regulation of railroads, regardless
of any constitutional provision, as where such regulation was expressly
permitted by federal or state constitutional amendment.8 9

85
86
87
88
89

Francis Wharton, Retrospective Legislation and Grangerism, 3 Irr'LREv. 50 (1876).

Id. at 53.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.

Accordingly, Wharton dismissed the federal constitutional limitation of the contracts or ex post facto clauses and the implied limitations on state legislatures stemming
from the separation of powers. Wharton, supra note 85, at 5%-54. On the centrality of the
non-retroactivity principle as a consequence of republican government rather than American constitutionalism, see also Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the
Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEo.J. LEGAL ETmics 241, 254-56 (1992). Professor Pearce notes that
George Sharswood, in his seminal article on legal ethics, saw the ban on retroactive legislation as embedded in the republican vision of protection for property and contract. Id. Its
authority was not dependent upon any constitutional text. For Sharswood, the lack of
express supporting constitutional language at the state and federal level made it all that
more important for lawyers to oppose such legislation. George Sharswood, An Essay on
ProfessionalEthics, 32 A.BA. REP. 1, 25 (5th ed. 1907) (originally published in 1854 as A
COMPEND OF LEcruREs ON THE AIMS AND DUnEs OF THE PROFESSION OF LAw, DELuvERF
BEFORE TE LAW CLASS OF THE UNnVERsrry OF PENNSYLVANIA (1854)). Sharswood argued

that a case involving a lawyer seeking retrospective legislation on behalf of a client was "a
flagrant case of professional infidelity and misconduct." Pearce, supra, at 255 n.108.
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Although Wharton utilized the insights of civil law scholars, 90 he
made it clear that his purpose was to elucidate principles already underlying "the decisions of our own courts." 91 To that end, he emphasized that the problem of retroactivity was a quintessentially judicial
question irrespective of the particularly American gloss provided by
judicial review. Properly understood, retroactivity was really an issue
of conflict of laws and was endemic to any system that recognized sovereignty exercised through positive law:
Laws may conflict not only because they emanate from rival sovereigns, each striving to possess the particular case, but because they
emanate from distinct periods of time, each of which may claim to
92
embrace the case in question within its sanctions.
Thus, even where there were no limitations on the legislature's authority to make positive law, nor any judicial authority to void legislative enactments, the issue of retroactive application was ubiquitous.
As Savigny put it, "the positive law may have undergone changes in the
interval between the origin of the legal relation and the present time,
[so] it must be determined from what point of time we are to take the
93
rule which governs the legal relation."
Wharton proceeded on the theory that his inquiry entailed the
"conflict of laws viewed in reference to time,"94 without reliance on
constitutional protections. He nonetheless perceived that the same
concept of vested rights-retrospectivity employed by American courts
could answer the universal jurisprudential question: To what extent
may a statute be given retrospective force? Again, the key was the vesting of a right affected by retrospective legislation. Only "such special
rights as vest the title to property in individuals [cannot be] affected by
retrospective legislation." 95 Thus, "[t] he leading maxim... is that estates to vest in future, are expectancies which the law can mold or
Wharton, supra note 85, at 51. Wharton placed special reliance upon
Savigny, as representing the historical school, whose conclusions are based
on a comprehensive induction; Schmid, as representing that school which
seeks to construct, by criticism, a jurisprudence which is philosophically
and logically consistent; and Lassalle, a political liberal of rare learning,
eloquence and enthusiasm, whose office it is to maintain at once, that loyal
protection of private obligations which is one of the first duties of the state,
with that liberty to remodel obsolete institutions without which a sovereign
must be comparatively helpless for good.
Id. at 52.
91 Wharton, supra note 85, at 52.
92 Wharton, supra note 85, at 52-53. In making this point, Wharton drew extensively
on the work of Savigny. See FR'EDRiCH C. VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES (2d ed. 1880) (originally published in English
in 1868 and in German in 1849).
93
SAVIGNY, supra note 92, at 49.
94 Wharton, supra note 85, at 57.
90

95

Wharton, supra note 85, at 54.
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divest, but that estates now vested, it cannot touch."96 Similarly,
"[e]xpectations are not rights... [so] that unvested rights dependent
upon a statute, fall when the statute is repealed." 97 Moreover, "on
general juridical principles," quite apart from the Contract Clause:
[N]o statutes which destroy the obligations of contracts, or particular classes of contracts, can be held by the courts to act retrospectively. For it is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that a
contract is to be construed according to the law which was in force
at the time of its execution.... The right to insist on the perfection
of these rules, no matter what may be the course of subsequent legislation, is vested in both parties at the time of the execution of the
98
contract.
Examining general jurisprudential principles that inform the civil law,
Wharton ultimately arrived at the same conclusion as American
courts. Wharton's application of the concept of sovereignty yielded
the same underlying principle of vested rights-retrospectivity as that
which animated American constitutional protection for economic
rights.
In sum, vested rights-retroactivity served as the central organizing
principle of early nineteenth century constitutional economic rights
protection. It controlled the interpretation of express textual protections for economic rights and largely limited those invoking the spirit
of constitutional protections, the fundamental principles of civil liberty, and the maxims of republican government. That the courts upheld the constitutionality of some retrospective legislation affecting
property and contract rights merely reinforced the importance of
vested rights while recognizing the difference between federal and
state constitutional protection for economic rights.
B.

The Irrelevance of Retroactivity and Vesting to Modem
Substantive Due Process

The modem view also holds that retrospectivity per se does not
invalidate a statute affecting economic rights. In contrast with the
nineteenth century's emphasis on the vesting of rights, however, the
typical modem approach considers the retroactive application of statutes to be no more than a factor to be weighed in deciding whether a
particular interference with economic rights constitutes a violation of
substantive due process.9 9 Moreover, retroactivity has virtually no inWharton, supra note 85, at 56.
Wharton, supra note 85, at 57.
98 Wharton, supra note 85, at 60.
99 Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionalityof Retroactive Legislation, 73 HAiv. L. REv. 692 (1960); W. David Slawson, Constitutionaland Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. REv. 216 (1960). See Armstrong, supra note 51, at
1204.
96
97

112
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dependent significance as a factor of consideration. "Questions of retroactive law are essentially questions of substantive due process" and
"any attempt to treat retroactivity as a special category to which special
rules are to be applied is wasted effort." 0 0
The irrelevance of retrospectivity in the modem constitutional
analysis of economic rights stands as a rejection of the vested rightsretroactivity logic that was predominant in the nineteenth century.' 0 '
Central to that logic were two categorical distinctions used to determine whether a statute divested a vested right or was in any sense retroactive. The first categorical distinction separated "property" rights
from "mere expectancies." Property rights, but not expectancies,
were vested and thus immune from retrospective alteration. 0 2 The
second distinction separated "rights" from "remedies." Rights, but
not remedies, were vested, although a statute materially changing a
remedy might be invalidated for having the practical effect of divesting a right. Additionally, a statute affording a remedy for a right previously lacking one might be permitted because of its effective
implementation of an "equitable" right.'0 3 Nineteenth century courts
applying these distinctions envisioned themselves as a legitimate "balance-wheel in the governmental machinery" because they were protecting economic rights, but not assuming the legislative power to
10 4
review the "political sagacity or social wisdom" of enacted laws.
In contrast, modem analyses of retroactivity and economic rights
consistently emphasize the lack of a logical framework for determining whether rights are vested. Proponents of the modem view assert
that the doctrine of vested rights did not prevent the nineteenth century judiciary from reviewing the wisdom of legislation. In essence,
they conceptualize the retroactivity doctrine as a version of substantive
due process.' 0 5 This approach reflects the critique of the categorical
distinctions used by courts to determine whether an interest defined
by the standing (pre-enactment) law was "vested." The modem analysis of retroactivity and economic rights evolved from a successful attack on the meaningfulness of categorically distinguishing property
Slawson, supra note 99, at 216.
Slawson, supra note 99, at 216-19.
102 See BLACK, supra note 51, § 184, at 236-37; CooLEY, supra note 83, at 359; SEDGwIcK,
supra note 51, at 653-54; Wharton, supra note 85, at 56.
100
101

See BLAcK, supra note 51, §§ 133-49; CooLEY, supra note 83, at 286-87, 361.
BLACK, supra note 51, § 177, at 229. See also CooLEY, supra note 83, at Chapter XI
(finding the legitimate meaning of the protection of economic rights by "the phrase[s]
'due process [or course] of law' [and] 'the law of the land'" in the concept of vested rights);
SEDGWICic, supra note 51, at 649 (using the concept of vested rights to solve the problem
presented by the constitutional protection of private property and contracts in cases that
do not come within the prohibition of the positive clauses in our state or federal
constitutions).
105
See supra text accompanying note 100.
1O3
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rights from "mere expectancies," and differentiating "rights" from
"remedies."
Using the vocabulary developed by Wesley Hohfeld in the early
twentieth century to describe the universe of legal interests, 0 6 commentators in the 1920s concluded that the idea of vested rights was
without legal meaning. First, they asserted that "property" as a matter
of legal definition had come to include any legal interest of value.
The idea of property was therefore incapable of isolating vested rights
from the universe of legal interests:
"Right" is here used in its general sense; but by splitting the term
into some of its component legal parts of "right," "power," "privilege," and "immunity," the nature of the interest involved is made
more manifest. Property interests are no more than legal relations
of lesser or greater value, any one of which may accurately be
07
brought within the popular term, "private property."'
For example, nothing in the definition of property excluded a wife's
capacity to be endowed of her husband's after-acquired lands (a
Hohfeldian "power") or distinguished between inchoate dower and
dower consummate for purposes of deciding which of these interests-equally created and defined by the standing law-deserved protection as a vested right. 0 8
Second, commentators observed that the notion of a "right" as a
matter of legal definition became inseparable from the remedy for its
violation. Thus, the availability of a remedy determined the existence
and scope of a right
[A right] is the legal relation of A to B when society commands action or forbearance by B and will at the instance of A in some manner penalize disobedience.' 0 9
This view made it impossible to justify retroactive legislation on the
grounds that it provided a remedy for a pre-existing "equitable" right
where no remedy had previously existed. Under the modem right/
remedy doctrine, such legislation amounted to the retrospective creation of a new right at the expense of another. As a result, retroactive
legislation analysis became an inquiry into the extent, consequences,
and justification for a statute's unavoidable alteration of pre-enactment interests"10
106 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
107 Comment, The Variable Quality of a Vested Right, 34 YALE L.J. 303 n.1 (1925).
108 ScutLocy, supra note 51, at 285-97.
109 Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 167 (1919).
110 See Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 59 N.E. 1033, 1033-34 (1901). The "distinction
between the remedy and the substantive right" cannot alter the fact that a statute "requires
the property of one person to be given to another when there was no previously enforceable legal obligation to give it." Id. It is permissible for a statute to do so pursuant to "the
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Due to the expansion of the legal definition of property to include all legally defined interests (or rights in the generic sense of the
term) and the expansion of the legal definition of rights to include all
remedies for their enforcement, the notion of retrospectivity became
all-encompassing:
[I]f... a law is retrospective which extinguishes rights acquired
under previously existing laws, then all... laws... are retrospective.
There is no such thing as a law that does not extinguish rights, powers, privileges, or immunities acquired under previously existing
laws. That is what laws are for."'
Moreover, nineteenth-century distinctions between property and expectancy, or between rights and remedies, no longer described the
logic determining whether an interest defined by the standing law was
immune from alteration. Vesting became a question of substantive
justice rather than legal definition:
[W]e are driven to the conclusion that the term "vested right" ... is
one of convenience and not of definition. It cannot mean more
than a property interest, the infringement of which would shock
society's sense ofjustice. For the idea of a "vested right" is less legal
than political and sociological.112The traditions, mores, and instincts
of a community determine it.
Consequently, under the modem analysis a right's vulnerability to
subsequent legislative interference does not depend upon whether
the right has "vested."113 Substantive due process provides the test.
Courts consider the rationality, reasonableness or arbitrariness of legislation-factors which attach no independent significance to a stat4
ute's being vested rights-retroactive."
power to make small repairs which a Legislature naturally would possess." Id. See also Dunbar v. Boston & P.R. Corp., 63 N.E. 916 (1902) (the distinction between rights and remedies is a "cloudy phrase" that "disguises" the fact that courts can properly permit the
legislature to "enact that the property of a person previously free from legal liability shall
be given to another who before the statute had no legal claim" where "the legislature with
its larger view of the facts... [was] satisfied that substantial justice required its action"); see
also Bryant Smith, RetroactiveLaws and Vested Rights, 5 TEx. L. REv. 231,246 (1927) ("[T]he
distinction between.., rights and remedies... is of use primarily as a basis on which to
classify decisions after they have already been reached on other grounds").
III Smith, supra note 110, at 233.
112 Comment, supra note 107, at 307 (footnote omitted).
113 See ScuRLocK, supra note 51, at 6.
The expression 'vested rights' has been avoided as much as possible. A
'vested right' is-an interest which in the opinion of the court is constitutionally protected against impairment. 'Vested Right' is a label which is attached after analysis and weighing of public and private interests. It is a
conclusion and not a point of departure.
Id. See also Smith, supra note 110, at 246.
114 See ScuRLocK, supra note 51, at 6; Hochman, supra note 99, at 695-97; Slawson,
supra note 99, at 216.
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It does not necessarily follow, however, "that what [a State] can
legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively."" 5 The
Supreme Court has held that "[t]he retrospective aspects of legislation,
as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process,
and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former."" 6
Nonetheless, the justification for such retrospective aspects of legislation, and indeed the identification of those aspects, does not involve
any vesting analysis. Modem commentators understand retroactivity
as the way in which a statute attaches present legal consequences to
past events. For them, the question is whether, under all the circumstances, those consequences are arbitrary or irrational. That question
can only be answered by considering the substantive reasons for a legislature proceeding in this fashion, its predicted effects, and the possibility of attaining legislative goals through non-retroactive
alternatives." 7 The analysis does not differ from that applied to prospective legislation. Under the doctrine of substantive due process,
the courts also consider whether it is arbitrary or irrational for a statute to attach certain consequences to subsequent events.
For example, in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.," 8 the
Supreme Court determined that the retrospective aspects of the Black
Lung Benefits Act included those provisions imposing liability on coal
operators for workers who had left the company prior to the effective
date of the Act. In doing so, the Court addressed the justification for
"basing liability upon past employment relationships, rather than taxing all coal mine operators presently in business."" 9 Noting that the
law imposed liability for acts which the coal operators might have
been unaware were dangerous, as well as liability from which the coal
operators might have reasonably believed they were immune, the
Court "hesitate[d] to approve the retrospective imposition of liability
on any theory of deterrence or blameworthiness." 20 Nonetheless, it
validated those portions of the statute as a cost-spreading device allocating to particular mine operators "an actual, measurable cost of
[their] business."' 21 In turn, the increased cost could be passed on to
consumers if operators, "saddled with the burden of compensation for
inactive miners' disabilities," were not prevented from passing those
costs along by "competitive forces." 2 2 It was not irrational for Con115 Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 543 (1982) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (alteration
in original) (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976)).
116

Id.

117 Cf Hochman, supranote 99, at 697-99 (discussing how courts have approached the
issue of retroactivity).
118 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
119

Id. at 18.

120

Id. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18.
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gress to "spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who
have profited from the fruits of their labor-the operators and the
coal consumers."1 23 Nothing of consequence, therefore, followed
from the Act's retrospective character. The challenged provisions,
like any of the Act's prospective provisions, had to pass the test of
substantive due process. Because the constitutional inquiry did not
turn on considerations of blameworthiness or deterrence, the retrospective character of those provisions was not dispositive.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Usery further displays the
irrelevance of retrospectivity. Powell challenged the seriousness of
the Court's suggestion that a theory of deterrence or blameworthiness
cannot justify retrospective liability. Powell argued that the imposition of liability did not necessarily spread costs to those operators who
had profited from the absence of liability in the past.124 Historically,
the coal industry had been highly competitive, and any savings realized from the absence of liability would have been passed on to prior
consumers. The competitive nature of the industry, however, would
also prevent operators from passing the increased costs of retrospective liability on to current consumers.125 Consequently, burdened operators would have to bear the costs of retrospective liability without
having obtained any countervailing benefit from the earlier no-liability regime. According to the Court's opinion, this result would reflect
an irrational method of cost-spreading. Thus, Justice Powell would
have permitted any particular operator to make a factual showing that
the imposition of liability for retired workers was arbitrary as applied
12 6
to its operation.
Justice Powell's concurrence calls into question the Use)y Court's
cost-spreading analysis and suggests that concepts of deterrence and
blame had more to do with the outcome than the majority opinion
suggests. The Court's indifference to the real cost-spreading effects of
the statute reveals its underlying adherence to a policy of deterrence.
As Professor Kaplow's superb analysis of the economic effects of legal
change reminds us, the imposition of retrospective liability may readily be justified for its ability to create appropriate economic incentives.' 27 The justification applies despite the imposition of liability on
persons who relied on a pre-existing no-liability regime, as well as
those who were unable to predict the consequences of their conduct. 128 Indeed, despite its claim to address only "cost-spreading," the
123
124

Id.

Id. at 42 (Powell, J., concurring).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 45 (Powell, J., concurring).
127 Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,99 HARv. L. REv. 511, 565
n.162 (1986).
128 Id. at 522-27.
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Usery Court in effect acknowledged a deterrence justification by recognizing that Congress could have chosen the scheme it did to award
some competitive advantage to "farsighted early operators who might
have taken steps to minimize black lung dangers."' 29 Even if there
were no operators who showed such foresight, the Usery compensation
scheme could hardly be considered irrational for creating an incentive to invest in discovering currently unanticipated dangers.'3 0 Thus,
although it expressly suggested otherwise, the Court's own opinion
revealed that nothing in the nature of retrospective liability is inconsistent with a deterrence rationale.
The presence or absence of blame is also nothing more than an
easily overridden factor in the substantive due process equation. That
equation includes many other justifications for attaching present legal
consequences to past acts, irrespective of moral blame.' 3 ' In the Usery
Court's own analysis, for example, the cost-spreading justification
alone overrode any hesitancy to approve the statute's retrospective
features. Though rejected by the majority, a deterrence rationale also
provides a sufficient independent basis for imposing retrospective liability. Whether the operators had a meaningful opportunity to
choose a course of conduct that avoided the statute's imposition of
liability-so that we might consider their failure to do so worthy of
moral blame-is simply not dispositive: there are many accepted rea32
sons for imposing liability without a finding of moral fault.'
The Usery analysis shows that there is no meaningful difference
between the substantive due process considerations applicable to retrospective and prospective aspects of legislation. The modem rule
against allowing retrospectivity per se to invalidate a statute affecting
economic rights reflects this collapse. The same test applies to both
retrospective aspects and prospective aspects of a statute. The substantive due process test of rationality or reasonableness merely requires a substantive justification for choosing to attach legal
13 3
consequences to past, rather than future actions.
Usey, 428 U.S. at 18.
Kaplow, supranote 127, at 565.
131
Hochman, supra note 99, at 697-711 (stating that the central factor in allowing
retroactivity is the strength of the public interest served by the law and the extent to which
its purpose can be achieved by prospective legislation); Slawson, supra note 99, at 251 (arguing that whether a party had an opportunity to avert a legal consequence for a past act is
"largely irrelevant" in light of the range of factors relevant to the permissibility of the current imposition).
132
Moreover, it would not be inappropriate to attach an element of blame to employers for failing to investigate the potential dangers of long term exposure to coal dust,
thereby justifying retrospective liability on a theory of blameworthiness.
133
Slawson, supra note 99, at 251. "To ask whether a law is vested-rights-retroactive...
is only to restate the question of its sufficiency in light of substantive due process. Vestedrights retroactivity is a superfluous category." Id.
129
130
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In addition, under the modem analysis, the very conception of
which statutory provisions are retrospective is as likely to depend upon
a provision's justification as it is on the legal consequences a statute
attaches to a past event. Most statutory provisions impose liabilities
based on a combination of past and future events. To the extent that
affected individuals perceive the future event as providing a permissible basis for imposing those consequences, they are likely to ignore
the retrospective aspect of the provision. For example, as the Usery
Court noted, "Itihe Operators have not contended ... that the Act is
constitutionally defective insofar as it requires them to provide compensation for present employees whose disabilities may stem from exposure that was terminated before.., the Act."13 4 The operators did
not even raise a claim with respect to the provisions that imposed liability based on a combination of pre-act exposure and post-act employment. Yet, as the Court suggested, those provisions were
retrospective in the same sense as were the provisions that covered
miners who had retired before the Act was passed. Apparently, the
operators did not contest the benefits to current employees because,
as Justice Powell noted, "liability... [to them] accords with familiar
principles of workmen's compensation" and, therefore, the only "unprecedented feature of the Act... [is liability to] miners ... no longer
employed.., at the time of enactment."13 5 The operators apparently
felt that it was legitimate to establish a cost-spreading scheme benefitting miners who were exposed pre-enactment but continued to be employed after enactment. Consequently, they failed to perceive that the
provision was subject to constitutional attack on retrospectivity
grounds. From the operators' perspective, liability for benefits to be
paid to current employees, although premised on pre-Act exposure,
amounted to a prospective change in the scope of worker's compensation coverage.
The role that substantive due process currently plays in determining whether a statute is retroactive is the same role that the doctrine
of vested rights played in the nineteenth century. In vested rights
analysis, a statute that altered a vested interest would be viewed as retrospective, 36 while a statute that altered a non-vested interest would
be viewed as operating only prospectively. The analysis then turned
on the definition of vesting with particular focus on what event was
legally necessary to establish an interest as vested. The chosen legal
vesting event served as a benchmark from which to judge whether a
statute operated retrospectively. For instance, if inchoate dower is defined as vesting at marriage or at seisin of the husband, a statute abol134

135
136

Usey, 428 U.S. at 16 n.15.
Id. at 39-40 (Powell, J., concurring).
See supra text accompanying note 70.
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ishing inchoate dower would be considered retrospective in its
application. On the other hand, if the vesting event is not marriage or
seisin, but rather the death of the husband, inchoate dower interests
are not vested, and a statute extinguishing those interests would be
37
held to operate only prospectively.
In modem retrospectivity analysis, considerations of substantive
due process play the same role as vesting analysis once did. The justification for a statute determines which of its consequences will be considered significant when deciding whether the law is retroactive. In
Usery, for example, the statute attached legal consequences to pre-enactment events. Nevertheless, since the operators considered post-Act
employment as justifying receipt of benefits, they viewed the provision
imposing liability for those benefits as prospective. The event justifying these consequences-continued employment-occurred post-enactment. In contrast, where the statute based liability on pre-Act
exposure and employment alone, the operators failed to see a justifying event, and challenged the provision as retroactive. One could
conceive of alternative conditions for liability-such as the onset of
Black Lung disease-which would justify both provisions.
Thus, both the nineteenth century and the modem approaches
look to a determining event when deciding whether a statute is retroactive. The central difference between the two approaches lies in the
analysis employed to determine the benchmark event. Nineteenth
century jurists defining retroactivity looked to the events which caused
rights to vest. Modemjurists reject the categorical logic of vesting and
consider the statute's justifications under the rubric of substantive due
process.
The unimportance of retroactivity in modem economic rights
protection, therefore, flows from the collapse of the logic of vesting
previously used to define the extent of constitutional economic protection. Both contexts in which one currently encounters the term
"vested rights" reflect that demise. First, courts occasionally slip into
using the language of vesting when deciding whether a statute may be
given retroactive effect. For example, a North Carolina appeals court
recently addressed the constitutionality of a statute that abolished a
husband's common law right in property acquired by the entirety. 3 8
The court wrote that a "statute may not be given retroactive effect
when such construction would interfere with vested rights acquired by
reason of transactions completed prior to its enactment."' 3 9 The
court ultimately upheld the application of the statute on other
137

See supra text accompanying note 70.
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Perry v. Perry, 341 S.E.2d 53 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 56.

139

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[vol. 79:87

grounds. 14 0 Its reference to vested rights, however, prompted one
commentator to voice the critique of vested rights that permeates
modem cases dealing with the constitutional protection of property
rights, 14 1 namely that the adjective "vested" only means that an interest is for some reason afforded constitutional protection.
There has been no satisfactory general rule to aid us in making the
distinction ... between mere personal powers and privileges created by statute or existing at common law and subject to legislative
withdrawal, and those to be recognized as "vested rights" under constitutional protection. When dealing with rights of the latter class it
will be found that text writers and courts are usually forced
to de14 2
fine them in terms of themselves, or "beg the question."
Without the foundation provided by the earlier categorical distinction
between property rights and other legal interests, it is equally plausible for any interest to be vested. "[T] he phrase [ ] 'vested right' " is only
a "statement[ ] of legal conclusion" used to hold that alteration of the
interest violates substantive due process. 143 Thus, although modemday courts may sometimes slip into using the language of vested
rights, they no longer undertake a formal vesting analysis. Substantive
due process considerations continue to control whether a statute may
be applied retroactively.
The second context in which vested rights language sometimes
still appears is in cases analyzing land use and development rights.'4
State courts have developed a substantial body of law identifying when
a landowner's development or use rights have become "vested" under
applicable zoning regulations, thus exempting the landowner from
subsequent changes in the regulatory regime. In this context, too, the
term "vesting" bears no more than a linguistic relation to the nineteenth century analysis of vested rights-retroactivity.
In substance, the doctrine of vested development rights is identical to the doctrine of zoning estoppel, which protects a landowner
from regulatory changes if he is relying:
140 The Court held that the common law rules giving the husband exclusive control
over the management and income from entirety property violated Equal Protection and,
therefore, were incapable of creating a constitutionally protected right. af. at 56-57.
141 Armstrong, supra note 51, at 1201-02.
142 Armstrong, supra note 51, at 1202 (quoting Pinkham v. Urborn Children ofJather
Pinkham, 40 S.E.2d 690, 695 (N.C. 1946)).
143 Armstrong, supra note 51, at 1202 (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 268 S.E.2d 468,
471 (N.C. 1980)).
144
See, eg., CHARLES L. SIEMON ET AL., VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
DEVELOPMENT EXPECrATIONS 96-100 (1982) (collecting cases); Grayson P. Hanes &J. Randall Minchew, On Vested Rights To Land Use and Develpnen 46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 373,
373 n.1 (1989); Robert M. Rhodes et al., Vested Rights: EstablishingPredictabilityIn a Changing

Regulatory System, 13 STETSON LAw REV. 1 (1983).
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(1) in good faith, (2) upon some act or omission of the government, (3) has made such a substantial change in position or has
incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be
45
highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right he acquired.'
Thus, the rule for identifying vested development rights is interchangeable with the concept of zoning estoppel. Consequently, some
courts have denied that vested development rights are constitutionally
protected at all. Instead, those courts have suggested that judicial protection follows simply from the application of equitable estoppel to
local zoning authorities. These courts conceive zoning estoppel as a
46
procedure implicit in the enabling legislation's regulatory process.1
Other courts have rejected even this limited, essentially statutory, protection for property rights. Those courts have concluded that if vested
development rights have no constitutional foundation, then they must
be illegitimate because equitable estoppel does not typically apply
against the government. 47
Most courts that have protected development expectations, however, have employed a constitutional notion of vested rights. They argue that if a landowner relies in good faith on a governmental act or
omission, and suffers substantial loss as a result, then an otherwise
unprotected expectancy may become "property" for purposes of constitutional protection. Interestingly, this constitutional reliance doctrine depends upon considerations of substantive due process rather
than any independent theory of vesting.
First, the consequences of finding that a development expectation has become a vested property right are different from those
under the nineteenth century analysis. The difference is highlighted
by what land use scholars have come to describe as the "vesting paradox."' 48 On the one hand, the designation of development expectations as "vested"-as in the nineteenth century-purports to establish
that they are immune from subsequent changes enacted pursuant to
the police power. 149 On the other hand, the finding that development expectations have attained the status of constitutionally protected "property" cannot achieve such a result in a modem context.
In the modern analysis, all property is held subject to the police
power, 150 and "vesting" only serves as a prelude to the application of
the substantive due process test. Even according to the supporters of
145
146

SiEMON ET AL, supra note 144, at 13.
SIEMON ET AT., supra note 144, at 38, 82.

147 SIEMON ET AL, supra note 144, at 38, 82; see Lewis Cox & Son v. High Plains Underground Water, 538 S.W.2d 659, 662-63 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Harrell v. City of Lewiston,
506 P.2d 470 (Idaho 1973).
148 SIEMON ET AL., supra note 144, at 49.
149 SIEMON ET AL., supra note 144, at 49-53.
150 SiEMON ET AL., supra note 144, at 49.
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vested development rights, the police power defeats those rights if the
government can show that a new peril has arisen since the rights
vested. 15 1 Also, when it is beyond cavil that the subsequent regulation
is ajustifiable exercise of the police power-where for instance it prohibits a use that would amount to a nuisance-the vesting of development rights does not exempt them from the regulation. 5 2 Thus, the
doctrine of vested development rights amounts to the application of
substantive due process in a specialized context, not an alternative to
its application. The doctrine addresses situations in which local regulators may have adequate justification for enacting new restrictions
but, considering the individual circumstances, inadequate justification
for withdrawing an earlier, specific approval.
The comparison between the modern protection of development
expectations and the nineteenth century vested rights doctrine is misleading for a second reason: it presupposes that constitutional protection of development expectations depends upon those expectations
becoming a vested interest.'55 That proposition is belied generally by
the modern definition of property as a "bundle of rights" within which
use rights are prominent "sticks," and more specifically by the law of
regulatory takings. The doctrine of regulatory takings includes use
rights and development expectations under the rubric of "property"
irrespective of vesting.' 5 4 The extent to which these interests are protected by the takings doctrine remains highly problematic and hotly
contested, but because of the expanded conception of property, all
regulations are vested rights-retroactive. Whether the owner receives
compensation depends upon the economic impact of the regulation
and its justification. 155 Establishing that development expectations
are "vested rights" is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to
their constitutional protection.
In summary, the modern constitutional doctrine of economic
rights protection accords little significance to retrospectivity. Nineteenth century jurists believed that the notion of vested rights-retrospectivity was grounded in a categorical logic that determined the
scope of constitutional protection without requiring judicial review of
legislative policy. Twentieth century jurists reject the earlier classifications and see substantive review of legislative policy as an inevitable
consequence of protecting economic rights. That the courts continue
to address the retrospective aspects of legislation and occasionally,
vested rights, does not detract from the fact that these concepts have
151
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supra note 144, at 49.
Hanes & Minchew, supra note 144, at 387-88.
Hanes & Minchew, supra note 144, at 386-87.
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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lost their nineteenth century significance as they have been absorbed
into the modem doctrine of substantive due process.
III
FROM RETROAcriVITY TO SuBsTANTrvE DuE PROCESS

The contrast between vested rights-retroactivity and its modem
critique provides a useful framework within which to understand Lochner era substantive due process as a transitional period with strong
links to its antecedent and successor forms of constitutional economic
rights protection. This framework reveals that historians and constitutional theorists have been mistaken in seeking to identify Lochner as
extra-constitutional. On the contrary, Lochnerera substantive due process grew out of retroactivityjurisprudence, transforming it in accordance with a critique with which the modem era has significant affinity.
Although the modem approach rejects Lochner's particular doctrine
of substantive due process, Lochner did respond to broad changes in
legal thought that continue to inform post-Lochner substantive due
process. The critique of retroactivityjurisprudence rendered substantive review of legislation impinging on economic rights inevitable.
The Lochner era response to the critique may have been wrong, but it
did not represent an improper abandonment of the established
framework for the constitutional protection of economic rights.
A.

The Standard Account Procedural to Substantive Due
Process

An appreciation of nineteenth century vested rights-retroactivity
and its modem critique provides a different perspective on the cases
that have continued to be accepted as marking the transition from
procedural to substantive due process. 156 The most prominent of
these is Wynehamer v. The People.157 In Wynehamer, the New York Court
of Appeals invalidated a statute that criminalized the sale and possession of liquor for non-medicinal purposes. The statute also declared
such possession to be a nuisance and subjected any liquor so possessed to forfeiture. Commentators have seen this ruling as the first
instance of a court using due process "to prohibit, regardless of the
matter of procedure, a certain kind and degree . . . of legislative

power altogether." 158 But Wynehamer expressly relied on a traditional
vested-rights retrospectivity rationale. The Wynehamer court invalidated the act "in its operation upon property in intoxicating liquors
existing in the hands of any person within this state when the act took
156

See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
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13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
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Corwin, supranote 6, at 467.
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effect,"159 although "all the judges were of opinion that it would be
competent for the legislature to pass such an act as the one under
consideration ....
provided such act should be plainly and distinctly prospective as to the property on which it should operate."'60 Thus, in its reliance upon vested rights-retrospectivity, Wynehamer did not differ
fundamentally from the broad spectrum of cases decided under the
contracts, "law of the land," or "retrospective legislation" clauses.
These cases provided constitutional protection for previously accrued
debts, dower rights, and other interests in land when they were impaired or destroyed by subsequent legislation. Wynehamer protected
liquor already purchased because "it is property innocently acquired
under existing laws."' 61 The holding did not challenge the legislature's ability to impose prohibitions on the future production or acquisition of liquor.
Since the statute exempted possession of liquor for medicinal
purposes, much of the controversy in Wynehamer centered around
whether the statute actually destroyed the defendant's existing property right in the liquor. 162 Conceding that some use might remain
after the statute, the court asserted that "this would not affect the
question."16 3 The existing liquor had been produced "for sale and
consumption as a beverage" and its commercial value for sale for that
purpose constituted ninety-nine percent of its value; thus, where the
act so "deprived" the property "of its essential attributes" as to render
it "worthless," the regulation operated as the functional equivalent of
physical destruction.'6 In dissent, Justice Johnson argued that the
Due Process Clause "has no application whatever to a case where the
market value of property is incidentally diminished by the operation
of a statute ... which in no respect affects the title, possession, personal use or enjoyment of the owner."16 5 The debate between Johnson and the majority concerned the legal concept of property as a
bundle of use rights with commercial value. It did not, however, represent any immediate break with the concept of vested rights-retroac159 Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 486-87 (Wright, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
160 Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
161 Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 385-86 (emphasis in original). Similarly, Wynehamer contained an eloquent attack on claims that statutes violating implied limitations on legislative
power or natural rights were unconstitutional because they posed a "great danger," especially "now, when theories, alleged to be founded in natural reason or inalienable rights,
but subversive of the just and necessary powers of government, attract the belief of considerable classes of men." Id. at 390-92. Insofar as it did appeal to these theories, it harkened
back to Calder v. Bull, in which Justice Chase's appeal to non-textual principles largely
restated the doctrine of vested rights. Id. at 390-91.
162 Id. at 387-90.
163 Id. at 385-87.
164 I. at 386-87. For good measure, the Court also noted that the act permitted physical seizure under some circumstances. Id.
165 Id. at 466-67.
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tivity, nor any transformation from procedural to substantive due
process. Justice Johnson was quick to concede that "a person is deprived of his property... [without] 'due process of law,' [when] the
thing itself... with the legal title is taken away." 16 6 According to
Johnson, the word " '[d] eprived' is there used in its ordinary and popular sense, and relates simply to divesting of, forfeiting, alienating, taking away property."16 7 This is hardly the argument that one would
expect from a dissenter in a case that broke with an entrenched tradition limiting constitutional due process protection of property solely
to matters of procedure.
Having determined that the statute in effect destroyed the property itself by depriving its owners of its value, the court went on to note
that no justification based on the public good could allow the destruction of private property because "the publicgood is in nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of every individual'sprivate rights, as
modeled by the municipal law."' 6 8 It would be erroneous, however, to
interpret Wynehamer as a new use of the Due Process Clause rejecting
the legislature's power to regulate property pursuant to the police
power. By arguing that it was beyond the scope of the police power to
destroy vested rights, the Wynehamer court was merely using traditional
vested rights-retroactivity doctrine to define the scope of constitutionally protected property and contract rights.
The United States Supreme Court drew the same distinction between liquor in existence and liquor not yet manufactured as the
Wynehamer Court had. In Beer Company v. Massachusetts,169 the Court
expressly held that the state could not "bargain away" its discretion to
legislate for "the protection of the lives, health, and property of the
citizens, and the preservation of good order and the public
morals."' 7 0 Yet, the police power extended only to liquor manufactured post-enactment and not to "property actually in existence, and
in which the right of the owner has become vested." 171 Subsequently,
the Supreme Court changed its position in Mugler v. Kansas.172 In a
holding which permitted application of the police power to destroy
liquor already manufactured, the Court linked the extent of protection accorded to property with the scope of the police power, which it
73
judged in a manner characteristic of Lochner.1
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B. An Alternative Account: From Expectancies to Property
Wynehamer illustrates the movement toward expanding the constitutional definition of property beyond the confines of what Professor
Jeremy Paul has aptly called a "physicalist model" 174 without abandoning the central idea of vested rights-retroactivity. Other cases of
that period similarly expanded the conception of what rights defined
by the standing law were vested, but their analyses remained well
within the retroactivity framework. In Holmes v. Holmes 7 5 and White v.
White,' 7 6 New York courts invoked the federal contracts clause and the
state's law of the land clause to extend constitutional protection to
husbands' jure uxoris, holding that New York's Married Women's Property Act could not be applied retroactively. In Holmes, decided under
the contracts clause, the court found that a husband's rights were
fixed at the time of marriage. Consequently, a husband married
before the Act would even retain common law control over property
acquired thereafter by his wife. l '7 In White, the court rejected the contract clause rationale and, under the law of the land clause, established that a husband's common law control would apply over
property acquired prior to the Act, but not to that acquired thereafter. l' s Holmes was unusual in restricting the Married Women's Property Act in order to protect a husband's capacity to control the
property of his wife as a vested right. The court, however, stayed
within the conceptual framework of retroactivity; its holding posed no
greater threat to that framework than one protecting a wife's capacity
to be endowed of realty.
Ultimately, though, the property right expanded generally to embrace the capacity to acquire property:
It seems to us impossible to draw a distinction between a right of
property and a right of acquiring property that will make a disturbance of the latter right any less actionable than a disturbance of
the former. In a civilized community, which recognizes the right of
private property among its institutions, the notion is intolerable that
a man should be protected by the law in the enjoyment of property,
once it is acquired, but left unprotected by the law in his efforts to
acquire it. The cup of Tantalus would be a fitting symbol for such a
mockery. Our Constitution recognizes no such notion...179
This expansion of the property right led directly to the Lochner era's
protection of freedom of contract. The key difference, however, be174

See, e.g., Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 So. CAL. L. REv. 1393,
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tween constitutional protection of vested rights and Lochner is that
freedom of contract was derived directly from the Constitution. Cases
like Holmes represented a false start of sorts by extending vested rights
protection to the capacity to acquire property under pre-existing law
rather than rooting it directly in the Constitution. These cases also
illustrate the extent to which extending the definition of property
would require rethinking the meaning of constitutional protection of
economic rights.
Dissenting in Wynehamer, Justice Johnson foresaw that abandoning the old categories would necessitate widespread reconceptualization of constitutional economic rights protection:
The inquiry, whether the chattel in its corporeal substance and entity is property, or whether the legal property does not consist in
some incident or right which the law confers or attaches, is one
more appropriate to the schools than the courts.... If we permit
ourselves to depart from the obvious, general fact, that the thing is
property, and enter this field of speculation into which we are thus
invited, we shall be in great danger of losing our way in its uncertain
paths .... 180
For example, if property meant market value, and any diminution violated due process, then "all regulations by the legislature, and all restrictions upon.., commerce of the state" would be prohibited.,,'
Nevertheless, the reconceptualization of the definition of property as
encompassing all valuable rights was already underway in many areas
of the law and would continue throughout the Lochnerera. For example, statutes removing common law restrictions on the alienability of
future interests were enacted in England well before the Civil War,
82
and their influence was apparent in the post-civil war United States.'
Some states moved more slowly to make particular interests alienable, but others, such as New York in 1896, simply declared that:
An expectant estate is descendible, devisable and alienable in the
83
same manner as an estate in possession.'
Although Wharton seemed to suggest that interests in land, in order
to be vested, had to be "vested in possession" (a proposition that in
any event was never fully accepted), the New York statute made clear
that a future interest need not even be "vested in interest" to be conceptualized as property. Increasingly the cases began to recognize
plausible grounds for protecting contingent remainders, executory interests, and reversionary interests against retrospective destruction in
180

Wynehaner, 13 N.Y. at 468-69.

181
182

Id. at 467.

183

See generaUy LEmws M. SimFs & ALLEN F. SMrH, FUTUE IrsEREs §§ 1852-62 (1956).
1896 N.Y. Laws c. 547 § 49.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:87

the same manner in which other "estates" in land were protected. 8 4
By 1905-coincidentally the same year as Lochner itself-courts in several states moved, without legislative mandate, to render future interests alienable.' 8 5 They reasoned that the qualitative distinction between possessory and future interests was a product of discredited eco86
nomic theory rather than a modem conception of property.
The redefinition of property extended in to the heart of the notion of estates in land. In one article, 8 7 A.G. Sedgwick criticized the
courts for misconceiving "the term 'property,' as used in the various
State constitutions."' 8 8 According to Sedgwick, courts misconstrue
the definition of property when they insist upon transfer of title, interference with possession, or physical interference with land before
awarding compensation to landowners, who have already seen "the
actual market value of... [their] property ... greatly diminish[ ]."189
Properly understood, "[t]he term property... in its legal signification
means only the rights of the owner in relation to it."190 After all,
Sedgwick continued, that was the lesson of the estate system itself.
The feudal system was coherent, logical, and intelligible. No feudal lawyer could ever have confounded the land itself with the tenure by which it was held or the quality of the estate. The fee was as
distinct a conception in his mind as any universitas of rights and
duties in the mind of a classical jurist.19 1
According to Sedgwick, Blackstone confused the true meaning of
property by using it to signify both a bundle of rights and the object
owned; accordingly, Austin's strict definition of property was responsi92
ble for setting things right again.'
In response, A. Knauth exposed Sedgwick's analytic error, but accepted his conclusion nonetheless.' 93 Although it was true that Blackstone confounded "the thing owned, with the right under which it is
held,"194 Knauth maintained that Austin's strict definition of the term
property included only instances of "exclusive possession, indefinite
user, and unlimited disposition." 195 The definition that Sedgwick
meant to urge, that Knauth endorsed, and that courts seemingly ac184
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cepted on an increasing basis, was simpler and far more comprehensive: "Taken in its natural and ordinary acceptation in which the word
is used at the present time by lawyers as well as by laymen, 'property'
consists of the whole mass of things or rights of pecuniary value
owned by an individual." 19 6 Knauth also acknowledged the existence
of another sense of the term that included estates in land and other
rights coupled with possession, but he considered this meaning to exist "more in scientific treatises than in the minds of our profession or
19 7
the reports."
Christopher G. Tiedeman delivered what was perhaps the crowning blow to the estate system and its traditional emphasis on title and
possession in his well-known Treatise on the Limitations of Police Power in
the United States. In his 1886 law review article, Wat is Meant By "PrivatePropertyin Land?, 1 98 Tiedeman defended against Henry George's
and Herbert Spencer's attacks on private property in land with a plea
in avoidance. Both, according to Tiedeman, attacked a straw man inasmuch as they presupposed that "the law recognizes an absolute right
of private property in land."' 99 Spencer saw this notion as violating
the law of equal freedom because "no one may use the earth in such a
way as to prevent the rest from similarly using it."200 George saw this
notion as a means of defending landowners' receipts of monopoly
rents. 20 ' Spencer's solution was to replace private property with collective ownership; all proprietors of land would become lessees of the
20 2
nation, allowing their rents to be used for collective purposes.
George's solution was to leave private individuals "the shell" of private
property in land, but to "take the kernel" by appropriating the rent of
land through taxation. This approach would allow individuals to retain "possession of what they are pleased to call... their land" and
even the right to sell and devise it.20
In response, Tiedeman argued that, once it was recognized that
there was no concept of absolute ownership of land, both solutions
were essentially compatible with the estate system. Implementation of
either George's or Spencer's schemes, while certainly requiring an
"economical revolution," did not require a legal one. 20 4 The structure
of the estate system demonstrated that there was no ownership of land
Id. at 327.
Id at 328.
198 Christopher G. Tiedeman, Wat is Meant By "PrivateProperty in Land?", 19 Am. L.
REv. 878 (1885).
199 IMl at 878.
200 Id. (quoting Herbert Spencer).
201 Id. at 879.
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203 Id.
204 I&at 884.
196

197

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:87

per se, only "land tenures" defined by the state. Even the fee simple
was qualified by the powers of eminent domain and taxation. Thus all
property interests were qualified, so that "[a] man can have only an
estate in the land, the absolute right of property being vested in the
State."2 0 5 Tiedeman concluded that "there is no 'private property in
land,' in the sense in which Mr. Spencer and Mr. George employ the
term, and the provisions of the law in respect to the tenancy of lands
20 6
are in strict conformity with the principles they advocate."
Tiedeman's analysis was hardly an endorsement of the "economical revolution" proposed by George or Spencer. Nonetheless, it incorporated into the analysis of land ownership the redefinition of
property that influenced the evolution of Lochner era substantive due
process. The model for the protection of property rights was no
longer ownership of land with its associated concepts of title and possession. Rather, it was embodied in the concept of value and the main
issue was the extent to which one was entitled to the value of her property. The model focused on personal property rather than real property because, in the absence of monopoly, personal property was
thought to reflect the value of individual labor.
For example, Tiedeman noted that both Spencer and George
"recognize [d] the absolute right of private property in the improvements which the possessor may put upon his land ...

which are, of

course, the products of man's labor."20 7 In George's scheme, improvements would not be subject to confiscatory taxation except insofar as they "in time become indistinguishable from the land itself."2 0 8
In Spencer's scheme, lessees of the state would presumably be permitted to sublet, assign, or devise their "leaseholds" (which might extend
indefinitely and therefore operate as the functional equivalent of a fee
simple),
as long they pay a certain rent, the amount of which is to be determined and varied by society from time to time, and provided further, that the land may be at any time reclaimed by society... upon
payment to these parties, their heirs and assigns, of a compensation
for the loss of improvements, which have become inseparable from
20 9
the land, and for future profits in the continued possession.
In either event, property's legitimate legal protection became associated with ascertaining the extent to which its value was properly
protected, and that depended upon the extent to which it reflected
individual labor rather than illegitimately acquired monopoly power.
205
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In Spencer's analysis, the value of property was unprotected if it was
acquired in violation of the law of equal freedom. In George's analysis, the value of property was unprotected where it included profits of
those who "cheated society out of its dues" by obtaining land from the
state without adequate payment, and by maintaining it while paying
taxes "grossly inadequate to the benefits thus received." 210 Although
Tiedeman did not endorse either view of the economy of land ownership, he agreed that property's protection depended upon the legitimacy of claims to its value rather than the system of estates in land.
Lochner era substantive due process questioned the extent to
which property values were entitled to constitutional protection. In
the railroad rate regulation cases, for example, the entitlement to a
reasonable return on investment became the first substantive due process right protected by the United States Supreme Court in that
era.2 11 The Lochner Court used freedom of contract to invalidate a
"labor law pure and simple," which it held was not justified by the
state's police power over health and safety. The Court proceeded on
the premise that the Constitution equally protected the free market
value of the employees' labor, to which they had a property right, and
the free market value of the employer's capital investment. Later decisions used a similar freedom of contract justification to invalidate
labor laws prohibiting yellow dog contracts. 2 12 The Lochner analysis
rested on the assumption of classical economics that capital was
merely "stored up labor" yielding legitimate market power rather than
illegitimate monopolies. Legislative attempts to remedy inequalities
of bargaining power between workers and employers were, therefore,
mere confiscations of the free market value of legitimately acquired
property. One side of the Lochner debate held that the unregulated
free market, structured by common law rules, yielded results that reflected the actual value of labor in a free market. The other side argued that the common law rules allowed illegitimate accumulations of
property in a market characterized by monopoly power. Ultimately,
the debate shifted to whether it made sense at all to think of property's legitimate protection as tied to the value of individual labor. In
neoclassical economics, there was no value attributed to labor independent of the structure of legal entitlements, the legitimacy of
which was the very question raised by the concept of market value as
property.
While identifying the doctrine of vested rights as "the basic doctrine of American constitutional law," Edward Corwin noted that the
doctrine encompassed a more limited conception of property than
210
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that reflected in Madison's celebrated Essay on Property.213 In that es-

say, Madison observed that property "in its larger andjuster meaning
...embraces

everything to which a man may attach a value and have a

right" and, therefore, "just governments .. .will equally respect the
rights of property and the property in rights."2 14 Corwin noted, however, that "[s]uch latitudinarian views ...found little or no support
from the Common Law, and had in consequence before the Civil War
little influence uponjudges." 215 Instead, "the doctrine of vested rights
... shield[ed] only the property right" that Corwin strictly defined as
"the right... of one who had already acquired some title of control
over some particular piece of property, in the physical sense, to con2 16
tinue in that control."
Committed to attacking substantive due process as a "virus" that
had corrupted the constitutional text through the due process clause,
Corwin missed the broader significance of the reconceptualization of
property rights that occurred during the evolution from vested-rights
retrospectivity to Lochner. Corwin saw that the inclusion of the fruits
of one's lawful contracts in the category of vested rights under the
contracts clause constituted an exception to the rule that the doctrine
largely protected "tangible... [and] especially real property."2 17 However, nineteenth centuryjurists conceived of protection for both property and contact rights in terms of retrospectivity, and their analysis
was not clause-bound in the manner that Corwin assumed constitutional interpretation should function. More importantly, Corwin confused the "latitudinarian" extension of the concept of property, which
he attributed to the development of substantive due process, with a
broad-based change in legal thought that requiredthe recasting of constitutional economic rights protection. As shown by Tiedeman's response to George and Spencer, and cases such as Mugler permitting
police power regulations to destroy what had been vested rights, the
consequences of this change were by no means determined. The expansion of the property right consistently required jurists to acknowledge that economic rights were in conflict with each other and with
the state. By focusing on vested rights-retroactivity, the courts had
simply denied those conflicts by distinguishing the effects of laws on
past and future transactions. In resolving those conflicts, Lochner era
jurists developed their own characteristic modes of interpretation,
which subsequently bore the brunt of Progressive and Realist criti213 Edward S. Corwin, The BasicDoctrineofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw, 12 MICH. L. REV.
247, 271 (1914) (quoting James Madison, Essay on Property, inJAmEs MADISON, 6 WRrnNGs
101 (Hunt ed., 1909)).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 272.
216 Id. at 275.
217 Id. at 272.
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cisms. To the extent that those criticisms were premised on Lochnerism as an entirely revolutionary concept, however, they failed to
comprehend the progression away from nineteenth century vested
rights-retroactivity as the central concept mediating between economic rights and legislative power.
C.

An Alternative Account: From Remedies to Rights

The distinction between rights and remedies was central to the
nineteenth-century belief that vested rights-retroactivity legitimately
protected economic rights without interfering with legislative power.
Because this distinction suggested that a person might have a right
but no remedy, it was subject to frequent attack.2 18 After all, an accepted function of equity was to provide a remedy where no remedy,
or no appropriate one, was available at common law. Moreover, the
distinction between rights and remedies was universally qualified:
although a person might have no right to a particularremedy, if retrospective legislation changed the remedy attached to a right, then a
2 19
substantially similar effective remedy had to be put in its place.
Nonetheless, the concept of rights without legal remedies implied that
the nonretroactivity principle was flexible. Even critics of the doctrine
conceded that changes in procedure could be applied retroactively to
22 0
prior transactions.
The distinction between rights and remedies, however, was also
critical to the maintenance of the non-retroactivity principle for another reason. Nineteenth century conceptions of law and equity justified permitting some legislation to be applied retroactively if the
statute provided a remedy for an equitable right that was unavailable
only because of a defect in the pre-existing law. Statutes designed to
cure these defects, called "curative" acts, could be applied retroactively, even in the face of constitutional provisions expressly banning
retrospective legislation.
To twentieth century observers, it seems odd that a statute might
provide a remedy for a right that existed in the standing law, although
the standing law provided no remedy. Used in this manner, however,
the distinction between rights and remedies reflected the nineteenth
century idea that the existing law included both legal rules and equitable principles as sources ofjudicially enforceable rights. According to
this idea, judges could properly use equitable principles to enforce
equitable rights that were without precedent; in the same manner, it
was constitutionally permissible to vindicate equitable rights through
retrospective legislation. In the retroactivity cases, conflicts between
218
219
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See, e.g., SEDGWICK, supra note 51, at 630.
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rights-where one party claimed a right under pre-existing law and
the other claimed under present law-were mediated in a fashion similar to nineteenth century private law, with courts routinely considering both the legal rights and the "equities" of a particular case. When
retroactive statutes rendered results that were consistent with the equities, they were upheld as constitutionally permissible, even if in the
absence of the statute a court might have hesitated to establish a new
equitable right on its own.
Nineteenth century litigation over betterments acts provides a
good example of the interaction between the notion of equitable
rights in private law and the logic of vested rights-retroactivity. Betterments acts were statutes extending the rights of a good faith improver
of real property to the value of improvements. Under the common
law of the early nineteenth century, a nonowner who, in good faith or
otherwise, entered, possessed, and improved real property was generally not entitled to the value of those improvements if they were "permanently affixed to real estate." 22 1 Under the doctrine of accession,
such improvements lost their identity as personal property and became "part of the land."2 22 Consequently, when an owner vindicated
his title to the land by ejecting the improver from possession, his title
was held to encompass title to the improvements. Thus, the landowner acquired the improvements free of any obligation to compensate the improver.
Nonetheless, equity might provide a good faith improver with relief in three situations. First, if the owner commenced an action
against the wrongful possessor for mesne profits-rents and profits
obtained by the improver by virtue of his wrongful possession 223 -the
improver would be entitled to a set-off against that liability in an
amount equal to the increased value of the property due to the improvements. 22 4 Second, if the owner otherwise sought equitable relief, the chancellor might invoke the theory that "he who seeks equity
must do equity"22 5 and condition such relief on the payment of compensation for improvements. Finally, a court of equity might grant
the improver affirmative relief if, besides realizing the benefit of the
221

For a general account of the law of betterments in the early century see Kelvin H.

Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REv. 37 (1985).
Dickinson, supra note 221, at 39.
222
223 Since the owner's action often required an accounting, the action might be an
equitable one. Thus, awarding the improver the value of his improvements might be explained as a consequence of the owner's invoking the aid of a court of equity. Such an
award might also be rationalized by the maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity."
See infra text accompanying note 225. Chancellor Kent treated an action for mesne profits
as an equitable one that allowed equitable defenses such as a set-off of the value of improvements. Murray v. Gourverneur, 2 Johns. Cas. 438, 441 (N.Y. 1800).
224 Dickinson, supra note 221, at 40.
225 Dickinson, supra note 221, at 40.
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improvements, the owner engaged in "inequitable" conduct, such as
standing silent while the improver made the improvements, while
2 26
aware of the improver's mistaken belief in his tile.
A debate arose between Chancellor Walworth of New York and
Justice Story over whether equity might grant relief regardless of inequitable conduct by the owner, or whether it might be appropriate to
award relief to the improver in the amount of the permanent value of
the improvements over and above mesne profits. In Putnam v.
Ritchie,2 27 Walworth agreed that it would be consistent with equitable
principles "to introduce this principle of natural equity into the
law"22 8 and wrote that if he felt authorized to do so, he "should give
the [owners] the right to elect.., whether they would retain the legal
title.., and pay.., the value of such improvements, or would release
to [the improver] their legal estate . . . upon being paid the value
thereof."2 2 9 Nonetheless, because the Chancellor was unable to discover "any case, either in this country or in England, wherein the
court of chancery has assumed jurisdiction to give relief' 230 he did not
feel authorized to "introduce a new principle... without the sanction
231
of the legislature."
In Bright v. Boyd,2 32 Justice Story took the opposite tack. Recognizing that "our courts of equity" have yet to extend protection to improvers seeking relief where the owner did not seek mesne profits or
otherwise invoke equity, Story nonetheless saw no insurmountable difficulty in providing such relief where appropriate. Story maintained
that "the denial of all compensation to such a bonafide purchaser...
where he has manifestly added to the permanent value of an estate by
his meliorations and improvements, without the slightest suspicion of
any infirmity in his own tile, is contrary to the first principles of equity." 233 Equity already provided relief where "the defendant has lain
by, and allowed the improvements to be made, without giving any notice to the plaintiff, or to those, under whom he claims, of any defect
in their title."2 34 However, even where
[T] he defendant was not... affected by this equity, as a case of
constructive fraud or concealment of title; yet that as the improvements were made bonafide,and without notice of any defect of title,
and have permanently enhanced the value of the lands, to the ex226
227
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Dickinson, supranote 221, at 40.
6 Paige Ch. 390 (N.Y. Ch. 1837).
Id. at 404.
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Id. at 405.
Id.
4 F. Cas. 127 (C.G.D. Me. 1841) (No. 1,875).
Id at 133.
I. at 132.
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tent of such enhanced value the defendant
is bound in conscience
23 5
to make compensation to the plaintiff.
For the necessary precedent to this equitable proposition, Story did
not look to English or American cases. He found authority in the
"positive dictates" of the Roman law where, he noted, improvers recovered the permanent value of improvements beyond any offset to rents
and profits. He found further support in the civil law treatises, as well
as the positive law of France, Scotland, and Spain, which provided re23 6
lief in some circumstances even to malafide improvers.
The private law disagreement focused on the extent to which the
absence of English and American precedent disabled the courts from
enforcing the improver's acknowledged equitable right. All the constitutional cases, however, accepted the proposition that statutes that
extended protection to improvers, while properly recognizing the improver's equitable right, could be applied retroactively. Ironically, Jus37
tice Story's opinion in Societyfor the Propogationof the Gospel v. Wheele
and the Supreme Court's opinion he joined in Green v. Biddle,238 came
closest to suggesting that retroactive betterments acts were unconstitutional because they altered the parties' rights as they would have been
adjudicated in the absence of the statute. Although both of those
opinions denied retroactive application to betterments acts, neither
did so without also considering whether the particulars of the statutes
were consistent with the improver's equitable right. Both opinions
defined this right more broadly than the courts would have done in
the absence of the statute.
In Society for the Propogationof the Gospel, for example, Story suggested factors which, if necessary to establish the improver's claim
under the statute, would have changed his view of the improver's equity, and would have altered his view about whether the statute could
be applied retroactively. He noted that "[t]here would.., have been
plausibility in the [improver's] argument if the statute had confined
itself to visible erections," did not extend to "improvements... in the
soil" or to improvements that "would be deemed waste at common
23 9
law," and applied only to claims "made by the original wrongdoer."
Similarly, in Green v. Biddle the Supreme Court noted that the statute
at issue would permit recovery by the improver of the value of the
235

Id.
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Id. at 133-34.
22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D. N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156).
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21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
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22 F. Cas. at 768. The improver argued that "upon the principles of natural justice,

it is iniquitous that one man should enjoy the fruits of another man's labor." Id. While
"there was no legal remedy" for the improver under pre-existing law, the statute provided
one that might be properly applied because it merely recognized the improver's pre-existing equitable right and, thus, did not "devest previous rights" of the landowner. Id.
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improvements made up until the time of the judgment dispossessing
him, "although the occupant was for a great part of the time a malae
fidei possessor." 240 At the same time, the statute would permit the
landowner to offset against the value of improvements only those
rents and profits accruing after he instituted sUit.241 Finally, in Society
for the Propogationof the Gospel, Justice Story did not hesitate to respond
to the merits of the improver's equitable claim:
It is difficult to perceive the foundation of the equitable or moral
obligation, which should compel a party to pay for improvements,
that he had never authorized, and which originated in a tort. If
every man ought to have the fruits of his own labor, that principle
can apply only to a case, where the labor has been lawfully applied,
and the other party has voluntarily accepted those fruits without reference to any exercise of his own rights. For if, in order to avail
himself of his own vested rights, and use his property, it be necessary to use the improvements wrongfully made by another, it would
be strange to hold, that a wrong should prevail against a lawful exer2 42

cise of the right of property.

Although inconsistent with Story's later endorsement of the claims of
good faith improvers in Bright,243 this response showed Story's accep-

tance of the notion that a statute could be retroactively applied if it
properly recognized the improver's equitable right, regardless of
whether that right was previously enforceable. Absent particular departures from the improver's equitable right, the retroactive application of betterments statutes was universally upheld on the theory that
it provided a remedy for an equitable right.2 44 A court approving ret-

roactive application of a betterments statute in 1900 could declare:
It is a matter that may be regarded now as almost an elementary
principle in the construction of constitutional law upon the subject
of retrospective legislation, that it does not refer to those remedies
adopted by a legislative body for the purpose of providing a rule to
secure for its citizens the enjoyment of some natural right, equitable
and just in itself, but which they were not able to enforce on acGreen v. Biddle, 21 U.S. at 82.
21 U.S. at 82-83.
Thus it may happen that the occupant, who may have enriched himself to
any amount, by the natural, as well as the industrial products of land, to
which he had no legal title, (as by the sale of timber, coal, ore, or the like,)
is accountable for no part of those profits but such as accrued after suit
brought; and on the other hand, may demand full remuneration for all the
improvements made upon the land, although they were placed there by
means of those very profits, in violation of that maxim of equity, and of
natural law, nemo debet locupletarialienajactura
242 Society for the Propogation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 768.
243 See supra text accompanying notes 232-36.
244 See Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 303 (1810); ScuRiocK, supra note 51, at 58 n.94
(citing cases).
240
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count of defects in the law or its omission to provide the relief nec245
essary to secure such right.
The invocation of natural rights and justice presented a problem
for nineteenth century jurists who portrayed vested rights-retroactivity
as consistent with legislative control over statutory policy. Sedgwick,
for example, argued that the doctrine holding that "there could be no
vested right to do wrong" reflected "a fallacious line of reasoning" because it "assumes that a power exists in the judiciary to decide on the
morality, wisdom, or justice of... legislation, and to treat them accordingly." 246 The notion of true equitable rights, however, supported the belief that this doctrine did not, in fact, require an
illegitimate "assumpt[ion of] legislative power" to review the "political
sagacity or social wisdom" of enacted laws. 24 7 Justice Story took pains
to defend equity jurisdiction from the charge of arbitrariness by systematizing its principles into a science. 248 Nevertheless, he had no
difficulty acknowledging those true equitable rights which were not
dependent upon any legal rule for their existence. The practice of
applying equitable principles and legal rules to derive rights in ordinary private law cases provides the backdrop for jurists' understandings about equitable rights. Against this backdrop, judicial
recognition of equitable rights did not require policy judgments entrusted to the legislature.
When Cooley referred to a vested right as requiring the
rightholder to have already acquired a "title," the required title could
be "legal or equitable."24 9 Thus, it was not surprising to discover that
"courts do not regard rights as vested contrary to the justice and equity of the case." 25 0 For example, statutes that "confirm[ed] acts invalid by reason of some informality" such as a "sale of lands defectively
25 1
made or acknowledged . . . have never been questioned."
"Although by such enactment individuals may be [thought to be] deprived of... [a] right of property previously vested,"
Such laws, so far as they cure defects, are not considered as impairing the obligation of contracts, or as divesting any right secured by
the law of the land, or as creating any new right: but as confirming
rights already existing, by furthering the remedy. The legal rights of
others affected in these cases are deemed to have vested subject to the equity
245
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139

existing againstthem, which equity these confirming statutes recognize and
25 2
enforce.
Because legal rules and equitable principles were considered
equally embedded in the existing law, courts and commentators
treated questions about whether a statute provided a remedy for a preexisting equitable right as a legal question that was familiar to the judicial role. Recognizing the existence of an equitable right was not the
same as deciding upon the wisdom of the statute recognizing the
right. One commentator summarized the point as follows:
[I] n numerous cases, the courts dwell largely upon the justice and
public tranquility that are promoted by these laws of amendment
and confirmation; and in speaking of certain retrospective laws as
being valid, take care to qualify their language, by calling them such
as are just and reasonable, and conduce to the general welfare, and
are not clearly unjust. But it will befound thatjustice is not the criterion
by which the cases are decided .... [Such] laws as cure mere defects in
form or remedy, do not impair the obligation of any contract.
Neither do they trespass on the judicial functions, since they are
cases in which the courts can give no remedy. Nor do they violate the
"law of the land," in the divesting of rights, since equitable rights are confirmed rather than divested, and the spirit of the law of the land is carried
253
out by the curing of mere defects in form.
Moreover, equitable principles were not without limit. The
claimant who could assert only what Cooley called a "naked legal
right" unsupported by the equities-such as the right to avoid a contract or conveyance defective for want of observance of some legal
formality-might find the right destroyed by retrospective legislation.
Whether that would be the result, however, depended upon the extent to which equity could properly intervene to protect the claimant
rather than the beneficiary of the statute confirming the contract or
conveyance:
The operation of these cases... must be carefully confined to parties to the original contract, and to such other persons who occupy
the same position with no greater equities. Subsequent bona fide
purchasers cannot be divested of the property they have acquired,
by a retrospective act changing the legal position of the grantor in
regard to the thing purchased.... The position of the case is altogether changed by this purchase. The legal title is no longer separated
W.W.B., supranote 51, at 519 (emphasis added).
W.W.B., supra note 51, at 520 (emphasis added). The reference to the spirit of the
law of the land clause also invoked the doctrine of equitable construction of statutes. For a
252
253

discussion of that doctrine during the nineteenth century, see William S. Blatt, The History
of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 Cumsozo L. REv. 799, 805-08
(1985) (showing that equitable construction during the early nineteenth century meant
giving a liberal construction to remedial statutes).
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from the equities .... Under such circumstances even the courts of equity
must recognize the right of the second purchaser as best, and it is secure
254
against legislative interference.

Changes in the conception of equitable principles in the late
nineteenth century rendered unavailable the argument that some retroactive statutes merely provided remedies for equitable rights already
embedded in the standing law. Only the main points can be outlined
in this article. Basically the interpretative principle supporting the
claim that the ban on retrospective legislation was to receive "equitable construction" was largely rejected.2 55 Objectivism in private law
rejected the notion that looking behind the technical rules of property and contract to discover and enforce the parties' intent was consistent with the emerging will theory. Considerations of good faith
and notice in property law, once the purview of equitable principles
such as constructive fraud, were increasingly incorporated into legal
rules governing adverse possession and the interpretation of recording acts. Considerations of equity no longer seemed so easily distinguishable from policy in the enactment of laws. By 1881, Cooley
seemed to change his mind about curative acts:
If one curative law may be held good, and another not good, the
result is that the validity of legislation in this class of cases must
depend upon the view the court may take of its justice. If,
in the
opinion of the court, it operates unjustly, it must be held void: but,
if not, it may be upheld. This is not a satisfactory condition of the
law; for the theory of our Government undoubtedly refers all mere considerations of equity in the enactment of laws to the legislature itself, with powers of
2 56
final decision.

Finally, the notion that equitable rights were independent of
legal rights rather than subordinate to them collapsed. Proponents of
vested rights-retroactivity had asserted that equity could provide remedies for legal rights unavailable at law and remedies for equitable
rights whose enforcement would "trump" legal rights. In 1887, however, Langdell announced that " [el quityjurisdiction is a branch of the
law of remedies" and that "true equitable rights.., are derived from,
and dependent upon.... legal right[s]." Consequently, if "courts of
equity and courts of common law declare the law differently. .

.,

one

of them must" be wrong.257 By dint of history and the continuing recognition of legal and equitable jurisdiction, the remedy may be available only in equity. If so, that only demonstrates that "courts of equity
254
255
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256 Thomas M. Cooley, The Limits To Legislative PowerIn the Passage of Curative Laws, 12
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may treat an act as a violation of a legal right."2 58 Professors Hohfeld
and Cook subsequently took the point to its logical conclusion in an
effort to root out the inconsistencies in the law that existed because
law and equity conflicted on the existence of legal rights.2 59
The collapse of the notion that the existing law was comprised of
legal rules and independent equitable principles gave rise to subsequent notion that the existence or nonexistence of a remedy implied
the existence or nonexistence of a right. Henceforth, the "standing
law" could only assign legal rights to the parties in a given instance. It
could not simultaneously suggest that some of those rights were defective and that the defects were subject to being cured by retroactive
legislation. Almost by definition, any statute with legal significance
would alter the available remedies and thus, be vested rights-retroactive. Statutes that purported to' provide a remedy for a right previously without a remedy were in fact creating a new right at the
expense of the beneficiary of the old rule. By changing what would
have been the result under pre-existing law, these statutes were retroactively legislating that the property of one person, previously free of
liability, should be given to another.
The new analysis, however, did not necessarily mean that all such
statutes were unconstitutional. Instead, it meant that vested rights
had no special immunity from legislative change; they were subject to
the same substantive due process analysis that applied to all economic
rights. The modem analysts who treated vested rights-retroactivity as
a sociological or a political concept determined by community mores
found some basis for protecting those mores in the earlier claims of
"equitable right." Shorn of its roots in the standing law, the retroactivity analysis used to protect so-called equitable rights became just another form of substantive due process. To protect economic rights
meant to protect "reasonable expectations" or "reliance interests"

260

where their destruction was not justified under the state's police
power.
CONCLUSION

By examining the overlooked history of the nonretroactivity principle, this Article has attempted to offer a more accurate depiction of
the historical transformation of the constitutional protection of economic rights. This depiction has revealed moments of profound
258 Id. (emphasis added).
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change in the midst of an otherwise gradual evolutionary process,
demonstrating that the standard and revisionist accounts of Lochner
era substantive due process are only partially correct. The change
from vested rights-retroactivity to substantive economic rights distinguishes Lochner from its predecessors. Consequently, this Article criticizes revisionist accounts of the continuity of economic rights
protection. At the same time, the story of how that change occurred
criticizes the standard accounts of Lochner as interrupting the otherwise continuous protection of economic rights. The changes that undermined vested rights-retroactivity and helped produce substantive
due process were part of a broad-based transformation in legal
thought. They remain with us today in the perception that, despite
contrary claims, vested rights-retroactivity does not circumvent substantive judgments about economic rights.
The criticism of the standard account undermines the historical
foundation of attempts to limit debate about economic rights protection by invoking Lochner. It remains uncertain how various newfound
continuities between Lochner and its predecessors will be understood.
It is unclear whether they establish a "republican" past, whose normative vision is more dependent upon equal opportunity and relative
substantive equality than previously thought, or whether New Deal
deference to economic legislation is a judicial abdication of responsibility for enforcing contract and property rights, or even whether, in
the long run, judicial passivity is preferable, despite express constitutional protections. That question is ultimately one of constitutional
theory rather than history, for the history itself is one of theoretical
transformation. The question of what constitutes appropriate constitutional protection for property and contract is informed, but not determined, by history because our own commitments deeply reflect
prior critiques. Even if we should create similar doctrinal formulations, we would, and properly should, undoubtedly do so for different
reasons and to accomplish different purposes. One hopes that this
study assists in exorcising the demon of substantive due process, not
by banishing it from the realm of constitutional law, but by revealing it
to be an ordinary inhabitant of that realm. Each age has its own form
of what amounts to substantive due process in the justifications it invents for the constitutional protection of economic rights. In inventing those justifications, we can do better than to pretend that they
are historically determined.

